Uncategorized Category Archives — Page 66 of 112 — Court-Martial Trial Practice Blog Published by International Military Lawyer

Post CAAF

May 29, 2010 | The Law Office of Philip D. Cave

Garcia v. Commandant, USDB, No. 10-3027 (10th Cir. May 27, 2010).

Fernando Garcia was convicted after a guilty plea before a general court martial. He then sought habeas relief in federal district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, arguing that the military appellate courts failed to afford him adequate review of his Fourth Amendment claim based on Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006). Because we agree with the district court that the military courts gave this argument full and fair consideration, we affirm its denial of Mr. Garcia’s petition.

This was a guilty plea case. NMCCA affirmed the conviction and held that Garcia waived the Randolph issue with his guilty plea. CAAF denied his petition. Had Garcia not plead guilty, he may have benefitted from Randolph which came out after his trial but during the course of appellate proceedings. You will recollect that Randolph is the third-party consent to search case.

A new approach to Rodriguez?

May 29, 2010 | The Law Office of Philip D. Cave

In United States v. Rodriguez, 67 M.J. 156 (C.A.A.F. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 459 (2009) the court changed years of practice when it came to late filings of petitions for review with CAAF. In Rodriguez the court held that:

In light of Bowles v. Russell, 127 S. Ct. 2360 (2007), we conclude that the congressionally-created statutory period within which an accused may file a petition for grant of review is jurisdictional [and may not be waived or extended regardless of cause].

The effect was to deny an opportunity for an appellatant to petition on meritorious issues or have access to the United States Supreme Court. Prior to Rodriguez it was not uncommon for appellate counsel and appellants to miss the CAAF petition filing deadline, sometimes by just a few days. The reasons for the missed filing generally came down to administrative error within the appellate defense divisions. For various reasons filing deadlines weren’t being tracked accurately. It’s my understanding that the divisions have taken measures to correct the problems. However, there were a series of cases post Rodriguez where the appellant was denied access to CAAF based on Rodriguez. While unfortunate, for those that had no seemingly meritorious issues to petition on there was likely no prejudice. But what about those cases where the appellant had a good issue (regardless of whether or not it was a winner)?

Of interest to civilian counsel

May 27, 2010 | The Law Office of Philip D. Cave

Courtesy of CAAFLog here is a link to a proposed amendment to Article 27, UCMJ.

If passed the bill will have retroactive effect.

SECTION 1. REIMBURSEMENT OF ATTORNEY FEES OF A MEMBER OF THE ARMED FORCES WHO RETAINS PRIVATE COUNSEL AND HAS CHARGES BROUGHT UNDER THE UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE DISMISSED OR WITHDRAWN OR IS ACQUITTED.

(a) Reimbursement Required Under Certain Circumstances- Section 827 of title 10, United States Code (article 27 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice), is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

`(d)(1) Nothing in this section (article) prohibits an accused from retaining private counsel to serve as defense counsel before a general court-martial or special court-martial.

`(2)(A) If the accused retains private counsel to represent the accused in a case described in subparagraph (B) and all of the charges against the accused are dismissed or withdrawn or the accused is acquitted on all charges (or some combination of dismissed or withdrawn charges and acquittal), the Secretary concerned shall reimburse the accused for all attorney fees incurred by the accused in the case.

`(B) Subparagraph (A) applies with respect to a case against a person subject to this chapter who is accused of any offense in violation of this chapter under circumstances involving the treatment of an insurgent, enemy combatant, detainee, or a suspected or known terrorist.

`(C) The Secretary concerned shall provide reimbursement required under this paragraph using funds otherwise available to the Secretary to carry out this chapter.’.

(b) Retroactive Application of Amendment- Paragraph (2) of subsection (d) of section 827 of title 10, United States Code (article 27 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice), as added by subsection (a), applies with respect to any charges brought under the Uniform Code of Military Justice after September 11, 2001, that involve the circumstances described in subparagraph (B) of such paragraph.

[Breaking]More on the West Point rape case

May 27, 2010 | The Law Office of Philip D. Cave

recordonline.com reports that:

United States Military Academy cadet has been convicted of rape in military court.
The judge in the court-martial has found Cadet Kyle C. Newman guilty on one charge of rape and one count of indecent conduct.
Newman was facing court-martial on two counts of rape and one count of indecent conduct. He had pleaded not guilty on those counts. On Tuesday, he pleaded guilty to three violations of a lawful general order of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, admitting to leaving post and fraternizing with a freshman cadet.

recordonline.com reports that:

Another LTC Lakin commentator

May 26, 2010 | The Law Office of Philip D. Cave

Andy Martin, Executive Director, Contrarian Commentary, posits that President Obama is not legally president, therefore LTC Lakin has a legitimate challenge to his orders.

Mr. Martin first tells us that:

I am completely independent and impartial in so far as the Lakin matter is concerned. So far as I am aware I have not had any contact with anyone involved in Lakin’s specific case. I am the author of the Obama book “Obama: The Man Behind The Mask” which first raised questions about Obama’s citizenship.

CAAF grant and remand – de facto immunity

May 26, 2010 | The Law Office of Philip D. Cave

Here’s an interesting grant and remand from CAAF.

No. 10-0265/AF. U.S. v. Douglas E. LONG. CCA 37044 (2009 CCA LEXIS 477).

WHETHER APPELLANT WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS BECAUSE ASSURANCES OF AIR FORCE OFFICIALS PROVIDED HIM WITH DE FACTO IMMUNITY FROM PROSECUTION.

Pendergrass

May 26, 2010 | The Law Office of Philip D. Cave

CAAFLog advises that Pendergrass v. Indiana, No. 09-866, is scheduled for the 10 June case conference at the Supremes. Here courtesy of Prof. Freidman counsel for Pendergrass and also of Melendez-Diaz and Briscoe “fame,” is the Pendergrass cert petition. Here also is the state of Indiana’s brief in opposition to certiorari at this link.

The issue will potentially impact United States v. Blazier , 68 M.J. 544 (A. F. Ct. Crim. App. 2008) (yes, that’s the correct volume according to LEXIS), concerning whether surrogate expert testimony complies with Melendez-Diaz. C.A.A.F. partially decided some issues, but:

[W]e order briefing from the parties, and invite briefing from the government and defense
appellate divisions from the other services, on the following:

Stolen Valor

May 25, 2010 | The Law Office of Philip D. Cave

Marine Corps Times reports:

A man who pleaded guilty last year to altering an identification card after he was spotted in the uniform of a three-star Marine general has been charged again with posing as a highly decorated Marine officer.

Sixty-seven-year-old Michael Hamilton of Richlands was charged last week with wearing a Marine colonel’s uniform and three counts of wearing medals, including two Navy Crosses, the second highest award for valor.

Hasan update

May 23, 2010 | The Law Office of Philip D. Cave

The LA Times has interesting piece which essentially posits that both the defense and Congress are being stonewalled in production of relevant information. Usually it’s only the defense.

But even before the gavel comes down, two legal battles are underway to try to force the Army and the Department of Justice to turn over documents dealing with Hasan’s past, particularly his personnel files, his mental health records and other documents that might suggest the government should have known he was a dangerously troubled soldier.

The Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee has taken the unusual step of issuing subpoenas demanding the records as part of its investigation into the shooting spree. What they want to know, said committee Chairman Joe Lieberman (I-Conn.), is "why was he not stopped before he took 13 American lives, and how can we prevent such a tragedy from happening again?"

New ACCA reminder on sentencing

May 22, 2010 | The Law Office of Philip D. Cave

In United States v. Eslinger, __ M.J. ___ (A. Ct. Crim. App. 14 May 2010), the court has set out a useful reminder in two areas: a military judge’s duty to instruct on all issues and the potential problem of defense waiver of instructions, and how to handle testimony that an accused does or doesn’t have rehabilitative potential.

1. Instructions.

A military judge has a sua sponte duty to give certain instructions when reasonably raised by the evidence, even in the absence of a request by the parties. United States v. McDonald, 57 M.J. 18, 20 (C.A.A.F. 2002) (citing R.C.M. 920(e)). Mistake of fact is a special defense that a military judge must instruct court members on sua sponte if reasonably raised by evidence. R.C.M. 916(j); R.C.M. 920(e)(3). Waiver does not apply based on the mere failure to request the affirmative defense instruction or to object to its omission. United States v. Taylor, 26 M.J. 127, 128-29 (C.M.A. 1988). However, the defense can make a knowing waiver of a reasonably raised affirmative defense. United States v. Guitterez, 64 M.J. 374, 376 (C.A.A.F. 2007) (citing United States v. Barnes, 39 M.J. 230, 233 (C.M.A. 1994)). For a waiver to be effective, it must be clearly established that appellant intentionally relinquished a known right. See United States v. Harcrow, 66 M.J. 154, 157 (C.A.A.F. 2008) (citations and quotations omitted).