Articles Tagged with sorna

Here is an unpublished opinion in United States v. Jones, No. 09-15005 (11th Cir. 17 June 2010).  I’ve commented before about how nuanced sex offender registration issues can get.

Christopher Martin Jones appeals from his sentence imposed following his conviction for possessing a firearm as a convicted felon. On appeal, Jones argues that the district court erroneously found that his 1992 conviction by a special court-martial for sodomy, in violation of United States Military Justice ("UCMJ") Article 125, 10 U.S.C. § 925, constitutes a sex offense that requires registration under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 42 U.S.C. § 16901 et. seq. ("SORNA"). Accordingly, he argues, the court abused its discretion in ordering that he register as a sex offender under SORNA as a special condition of his supervised release (special condition 5). In addition, Jones also argues that the court abused its discretion in imposing special conditions 2, 3, 4, 6, and 7 of his supervised release, which are targeted toward preventing future sexual misconduct. Relying on 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d), Jones contends that, in light of the fact that his criminal history includes only one conviction for a sex offense, and this offense occurred in 1992, these special conditions are not reasonably related to the sentencing goals set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

For the reasons set forth below, we vacate and remand.

Army Times reports:

A federal appeals panel says sex offenders convicted in military court but housed by the Bureau of Prisons are not eligible for civil commitment.

A three-judge panel of the 4th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals issued the ruling Monday in the case of former Army officer Benjamin Barnard Joshua, who pleaded guilty in military court to sexually molesting children. He was transferred to a federal penitentiary because of military prison downsizing.

The AFCCA has issued its opinion in the relook at United States v. Rose.  The court comes to the same conclusion that the defense counsel advice to the client about sex offender registration was wrong and IAC.  The initial decision at AFCCA is here, and CAAF’s 28 October 2009 journal entry and order is here.

The statements of the appellant’s civilian defense counsel clearly attempt to minimize the seriousness of the indecent assault charges and assure the appellant that he would not have to register as a sex offender. In his testimony at the DuBay hearing, Mr. NC, the appellant’s civilian defense counsel, repeatedly used such phrases as “fairly innocuous” and “just foolery” to describe the sexual assault offenses. Mr. NC claimed lack of memory on many points but, in response to questions from the military judge, did recall concluding that sex offender registration was “not really a credible concern.” Consistent with this testimony, the appellant testified that when he directly asked Mr. NC if sex offender registration would be required Mr. NC told him: “I don’t see why it would be with the allegations that were brought against you. I don’t see why that would be a registerable offense.”

Bottom line it appears AFCCA believes the defense counsel considered the statements as “affirmative misrepresentations . . . concerning significant collateral consequences.”  Slip op. at 5.  Rose was tried in 2005.

There are two decisions issued today of some relevance to military justice practitioners.  One relates to Miranda and another to SORNA.

As to Berghuis v. Thompkins, Kent Scheidegger of crimeandconsequences blog says:

The Miranda rule remains intact in that the police must warn suspects of their rights and that an invocation of those rights by the suspect requires the police to stop questioning. Today’s decision involves what is needed to establish whether a suspect invoked or waived his rights.

There’s been lots of litigation about SORNA.  But now, courtesy of Sentencing Law & Policy we learn that DOJ has some recommendations for amending SORNA.

You will be interested to know that this morning the U.S. Department of Justice issued proposed supplemental guidelines modifying several requirements for compliance with SORNA. Many address concerns raised by the states and other stakeholders. They do the following:

  • Gives jurisdictions discretion to exempt juvenile offenders from public website posting
  • Provides information concerning the review process for determining that jurisdictions have substantially implemented
  • Gives jurisdictions discretion to modify the retroactive registration requirement to apply to new felony convictions only
  • Provides mechanisms for newly recognized tribes to elect whether to become SORNA registration jurisdictions and to implement SORNA
  • Expands required registration information to include the forms signed by sex offenders acknowledging that they were advised of their registration obligations
  • Requires jurisdictions to exempt sex offenders’ e-mail addresses and other Internet identifiers from public website posting
  • Requires jurisdictions to have sex offenders report international travel 21 days in advance
  • Clarifies mechanism for interjurisdictional information sharing and tracking.

(update) Here is a link to the 14 May 2010 entry in the Federal Register.

The advice to an accused about sexual offender registration is complicated.  Cases such as Williams v. Lee and Keathley, No. ED 93827, from the Court of Appeals of Missouri, Eastern District, Division Five, decided May 4, 2010.  This is a retroactivity case.

On February 5, 2000, Williams pled guilty in a military tribunal to one specification of carnal knowledge under Article 120 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice ("UCMJ"), and one specification of sodomy with a child under the age of 16 in violation of Article 125 of the UCMJ. No law — Missouri, federal, or military — required Williams to register as a sex offender at the time of his convictions.

However, with the passage of SORNA to police went out and required registration.  But,

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