miranda Tag Archives — Court-Martial Trial Practice Blog

Ambiguous request for counsel

August 28, 2012 | The Law Office of Philip D. Cave

Result – statements suppressed, and will be in the 9th because of Sessoms v. Runnels, No. 08-17790, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 17206 (9th Cir. 2012) Wow. What about Davis v. United States?

Davis doesn’t apply because the ambiguous request came BEFORE the accused was advised of his Miranda rights. So, why isn’t there a similar situation for an accused who makes an ambiguous request prior to Article 31, UCMJ, warnings.

Nonetheless, a critical factual distinction between Sessoms’s statements and those evaluated by the Court in both Davis and Berghuis remains: Sessoms made his statements before he was informed of his rights under Miranda. The Miranda Court held that the coercive atmosphere of interrogation makes it essential for a suspect to be “given a full and effective warning of his rights at the outset of the interrogation process.” 384 U.S. at 445. As the Court stressed, when “the police [have] not advised the defendant of his constitutional privilege . . . at the outset of the interrogation,” the suspect’s “abdication of [that] constitutional privilege—the choice on his part to speak to the police—[is] not made knowingly or competently because of the failure to apprise him of his rights.” Id. at 465 (citing Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964)).

SCOTUS activity

June 1, 2010 | The Law Office of Philip D. Cave

There are two decisions issued today of some relevance to military justice practitioners. One relates to Miranda and another to SORNA.

As to Berghuis v. Thompkins, Kent Scheidegger of crimeandconsequences blog says:

The Miranda rule remains intact in that the police must warn suspects of their rights and that an invocation of those rights by the suspect requires the police to stop questioning. Today’s decision involves what is needed to establish whether a suspect invoked or waived his rights.

Does 18 U.S. Code 2251A apply extraterritorially

March 24, 2010 | The Law Office of Philip D. Cave

Thanks to OpinoJuris for pointing us to the 11th Circuit decision in United States v. Frank. You will recollect that CAAF has found that the CP related statutes don’t apply overseas. Here is part of the OJ summary.

The Eleventh Circuit upheld the conviction finding that (1) Miranda warnings were unnecessary; (2) the statute applied extraterritorially; and (3) the “purchase” of a child may occur through payment directly to the child, rather than a third party.

The Court found that generally, “statements obtained by foreign officers conducting interrogations in their own nations have been held admissible despite a failure to give Miranda warnings to the accused.” The reasoning behind this rule is that the exclusion of evidence by an American court has little to no deterrent effect on foreign police practices. That is, our “Constitution cannot compel such specific, affirmative action by foreign sovereigns.” Moreover, the joint venture exception does not apply because American officials did not know of Frank’s presence in Cambodia until after he was arrested and did not participate in Frank’s detention or interrogation.

Supreme Court “Miranda” cases

February 24, 2010 | The Law Office of Philip D. Cave

The court has decided Maryland v. Shatzer (background documents on SCOTUSWiki here ) and also Florida v. Powell (background documents on SCOTUSWiki here). Both cases relate to “Miranda” rights and confessions. In Powell, the issue was how much detail must go into a “Miranda” warning in order to be sufficient, in Shatzer the court addresses the break in custody situation.

In Powell the issue was whether the rights advice given properly conveyed to the suspect that he had the right to counsel present during questioning and not just before being questioned. After an interesting discussion showing how ambiguous the language used was, the court found the appellant was adequately advised. Interestingly, the court noted that:

The standard warnings used by the Federal Bureau of Investigation are exemplary. They provide, in relevant part: “You have the right to talk to a lawyer for advice before we ask you any questions. You have the right to have a lawyer with you during questioning.” Ibid., n. 3 (internal quotation marks omitted). This advice is admirably informative, but we decline to declare its precise formulation necessary to meet Miranda’s requirements. Different words were used in the advice Powell received, but they communicated the same essential message.

When investigators talk with Major Hasan we’ll know more

November 16, 2009 | The Law Office of Philip D. Cave

And pigs have wings and can fly.

The media continues to make the comment that investigators are waiting to talk with Major Hasan, at Fort Hood, and once they do we’ll know more about his motives. Huh? We’ll find out at court-martial what each party is suggesting are the reasons and motives, but unlikely before then, except for the continual extra-judicial statements by people close to the investigation who have been told not to talk about it but are quite happy to without a name.

Major Hasan asked for counsel, he’s got counsel; he’s a represented accused; charges are preferred; and he’s apparently in custody. So . . .