Articles Posted in Appeals

It is always good to file or submit petitions and pleadings on time.  Sometimes the due date can be complicated.

Let’s say your due date falls on a Sunday?  A federal holiday?  Or???  Here is a thought from friend and colleague Dew Process.

CAAF, in its decision in United States v. Rodriguez, 67 M.J. 110 (CAAF), cert. denied 558 U.S. 969 (2009).  The majority in Rodriguez held that the 60 day time-limit in Article 67(b), UCMJ, was jurisdictional and rejected the long-standing precedent of this Court essentially adopting the “equitable tolling” principle. The Rodriguez majority based its decision on Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205 (2007), a federal civil appeal in a habeas corpus action.

Trial and appellate lawyers often need to interpret what a statute means and how it applies to their case.

“There are some great Supreme Court cases on statutory interpretation, including the famous discussion regarding whether a tomato is a fruit.”

Says Prof. Tessa Dysart on Appellate Advocacy Blog.  She is referring to Nix v. Hedden, 149 U.S. 304 (1893), which held that “under customs law tomatoes counted as vegetables — and the importer had to keep paying the tariff.”  Her post is referring to State v. Barnes, decided 12 October 2017, by the Washington Supreme Court.

On 12 October 2017, the CAAF granted petitions worthy of watching:

No. 17-0556/AR. U.S. v. Joseph R. Armstrong. CCA 20150424. On consideration of the petition for grant of review of the decision of the United States Army Court of Criminal Appeals, it is ordered that said petition is hereby granted on the following issue:

WHETHER ASSAULT CONSUMMATED BY A BATTERY IS A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF ABUSIVE SEXUAL CONTACT BY CAUSING BODILY HARM.

Under Article 62, UCMJ, the prosecution can appeal a military judge’s trial ruling under six circumstances.  The two most common are:

(A) An order or ruling of the military judge which terminates the proceedings with respect to a charge or specification.

For example, a military judge dismisses a specification because the specification fails to state an offense.  That is what happened in United States v. Schloff.  The government appealed, the ACCA decided the appeal in favor of the government, CAAF agreed with the ACCA, and the Supreme Court declined to issue a writ of certiorari.  (We are now in the traditional Article 66, UCMJ, appeal before ACCA on the sole specification for which there was a conviction.)

The CAAF daily journal for 15 June 2017 has this entry:  No. 17-0003/AR. U.S. v. Christopher B. Hukill. CCA 20140939. On consideration of Appellee’s petition for reconsideration of this Court’s decision, United States v. Hukill, 76 M.J. 219 (C.A.A.F. 2017), it is ordered that said petition for reconsideration be, and the same is, hereby denied.

To refresh.

CAAF decided the Army case of United States v. Hukill, 76 M.J. 219, No. 17-0003/AR (slip op.beside-link-icon), on Tuesday, May 2, 2017. A short opinion reiterates the rationale of United States v. Hills, 75 M.J. 350 (C.A.A.F. Jun. 27, 2016) .  “[T]he use of evidence of charged conduct as M.R.E. 413 propensity evidence for other charged conduct in the same case is error, regardless of the forum, the number of victims, or whether the events are connected.” Slip op. at 6. CAAF reverses the decision of the Army CCA that found Hills inapplicable in judge-alone trials, reverses the appellant’s convictions, and authorizes a rehearing.

CAAF’s Daily Journal has this entry for 8 March 2017.

No. 17-0226/AF. U.S. v. Dorian K. Owens. CCA 38834. On consideration of the petition for grant of review of the decision of the United States Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals, it is ordered that said petition is hereby granted on the following issue:

WHETHER THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS VIOLATED APPELLANT’S FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHT AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY WHEN IT AFFIRMED A CONVICTION FOR THE LESSER-INCLUDED OFFENSE OF SEXUAL ASSAULT BY BODILY HARM, WHEN APPELLANT WAS CHARGED WITH THAT SAME OFFENSE AT TRIAL AND ACQUITTED BY A PANEL OF OFFICERS.

CBS news has picked up this:

A former Fort Bragg soldier who killed four women and raped others more than 25 years ago is again headed for execution.

The Fayetteville Observer reports Ronald Gray last week lost a battle to keep in place a federal court’s order issued eight years ago blocking his execution.

John Wesley Hall’s website is an excellent resource for issues involving the Fourth Amendment–FourthAmendment.com.  In pointing to a search warrant case Mr. Hall quotes from the opinion.

We remind McCollum’s counsel that “the statement of facts in an appellate brief should be a concise narrative of the facts stated in accordance with the standard of review appropriate to the judgment and should not be argumentative.” King v. State, 799 N.E.2d 42, 45 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (citing Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(6)), trans. denied (2004), cert. denied. Also, we disapprove of counsel’s accusation that the State has “stoop[ed]” to “desperate measures … to attempt to demonstrate the reliability and credibility of the confidential informant” mentioned in the affidavit and has “either played word games with this court or simply fabricated facts in its efforts to make an argument.” Reply Br. at 10, 11. Such hyperbolic barbs have no place in an appellate brief. Cnty. Line Towing, Inc. v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 714 N.E.2d 285, 291 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied (2000).

McCollum v. State, 2016 Ind. App. LEXIS 370 (Sept. 30, 2016).

Packingham v. North Carolina is the case of Lester Packingham, a North Carolina man who became a registered sex offender after he was convicted, at the age of 21, of taking indecent liberties with a minor. Six years after Packingham’s conviction, North Carolina enacted a law that made it a felony for registered sex offenders to access a variety of websites, from Facebook to The New York Times and YouTube. Packingham was convicted of violating this law after a police officer saw a Facebook post in which Packingham celebrated, and gave thanks to God for, the dismissal of a traffic ticket. The justices today agreed to review Packingham’s contention that the law violates the First Amendment.

Issue: Whether, under the court’s First Amendment precedents, a law that makes it a felony for any person on the state’s registry of former sex offenders to “access” a wide array of websites – including Facebook, YouTube, and nytimes.com – that enable communication, expression, and the exchange of information among their users, if the site is “know[n]” to allow minors to have accounts, is permissible, both on its face and as applied to petitioner, who was convicted based on a Facebook post in which he celebrated dismissal of a traffic ticket, declaring “God is Good!”

In Esquivel-Quintana v. Lynch, into an area of law called by Prof. Berman, as “crimmigration” – the intersection of immigration and criminal law. The petitioner in the case, Juan Esquivel-Quintana, was a lawful permanent resident of the United States in 2009, when he was charged with violating a California law that makes it a crime to have sexual relations with someone under the age of 18 when the age difference between the two people involved is more than three years; he had had consensual sex with his 16-year-old girlfriend when he was 20 and 21 years old. The federal government then sought to remove Esquivel-Quintana from the United States on the ground that his conviction constituted the “aggravated felony” of “sexual abuse of a minor.” The lower courts agreed with the federal government, but now the Supreme Court will decide.