On March 25, 2026, the United States Army Court of Criminal Appeals issued its decision in United States v. Williams-Clark (ARMY 20230185). The court set aside a sexual assault conviction — one that carried a two-year confinement term — not on the merits, but because the verdict itself was fatally ambiguous. The military judge convicted Private Williams-Clark of sexual assault without consent while simultaneously acquitting him of sexual assault when the victim was incapable of consenting. Both specifications covered the same day, the same location, and the same victim — but two separate sexual acts.

The court could not determine which act formed the basis of the conviction. That uncertainty, the court held, made meaningful appellate review impossible. The conviction had to go.

What Actually Happened at Trial

Published by Cave & Freeburg LLP | Military Justice Defense Attorneys

Case Citation: United States v. Castillo, No. ACM 40705 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Mar. 11, 2026) | Unpublished

A recent Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals decision — United States v. Castillo — raises an important question every military defense lawyer must understand: when does a military judge have a duty to instruct on an affirmative defense, even during a guilty plea proceeding? The answer directly affects court-martial strategy, plea negotiations, and appellate rights for servicemembers facing charges under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).

Overview

The Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals (NMCCA) decided United States v. Selleneit on 17 March 2026, affirming the findings and sentence of a general court-martial tried at Naval Station Rota, Spain. Fire Controlman Aegis Petty Officer Second Class (E-5) George B. Selleneit faced charges of sexual assault under Article 120, UCMJ, and unlawful entry under Article 129, UCMJ. A panel of officer and enlisted members acquitted him of sexual assault but convicted him of unlawful entry. The court sentenced Selleneit to reduction to E-3, restriction to USS Porter for two months, and forfeiture of all pay and allowances for two months (with the convening authority waiving forfeitures above two-thirds pay per month).

Factual Background

Government appeals under Article 62 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) involve some of the most procedurally complex cases in the military justice system. When the Government challenges a military judge’s ruling during an ongoing court-martial, the case unexpectedly shifts from trial litigation to appellate practice. Defense counsel must quickly defend a favorable ruling before the service court of criminal appeals while protecting the accused’s rights and maintaining the integrity of the trial record. The Navy–Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals’ decision in United States v. ScottGeorge demonstrates both the legal standards for these appeals and the importance of experienced appellate advocacy.

The Government’s Interlocutory Appeal

In ScottGeorge, the Government invoked Article 62(a)(1)(B), UCMJ, to challenge a military judge’s order suppressing statements obtained during an NCIS interrogation. Article 62 allows the Government to appeal certain rulings that exclude evidence constituting substantial proof of a material fact. Unlike typical appeals, however, Article 62 proceedings occur while the court-martial is still ongoing. Once the Government files the appeal, the trial is paused, and the appellate court reviews the ruling based on the existing record.

The Glenn Defense Marine Asia (GDMA) scandal—commonly referred to as the “Fat Leonard” case—was one of the largest corruption investigations in the history of the U.S. Navy. The scheme centered on Leonard Glenn Francis, the head of GDMA, a Singapore-based ship husbanding contractor that serviced U.S. Navy vessels throughout the Western Pacific.

Beginning in the early 2000s and continuing for more than a decade, Francis cultivated relationships with Navy officers and contracting officials. In exchange for cash, luxury travel, hotel stays, meals, and the services of prostitutes, certain officials provided GDMA with classified ship schedules, steered port visits toward GDMA-controlled ports, and approved inflated or fraudulent invoices. The government alleged that GDMA overbilled the Navy by tens of millions of dollars.

Francis was arrested in 2013 in a federal sting operation. He pleaded guilty in 2015 in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California to bribery, conspiracy, and fraud-related offenses. His sentencing was delayed for years while he cooperated with prosecutors. Dozens of Navy officers—active and retired—were investigated. More than 30 individuals, including both officers and civilians, ultimately pleaded guilty to various offenses.

United States v. Munn (ARMY 20250252)

United States Army Court of Criminal Appeals — Summary Disposition (25 Feb 2026)

Procedural Posture

Senior Airman Brennen J. Patterson served in the U.S. Air Force and stood before a general court-martial convened at Joint Base San Antonio–Fort Sam Houston, Texas. The military judge accepted Patterson’s plea, pursuant to a plea agreement, to one specification of illegal transportation of an alien within the United States in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii) as assimilated under Article 134, UCMJ. The judge sentenced Patterson to a bad-conduct discharge, three months’ confinement, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and reduction to the grade of E-1. The convening authority took no action on the findings but suspended the forfeitures and waived certain automatic forfeitures.

Patterson’s plea agreement withdrew and dismissed with prejudice additional charges, including conspiracy and carrying a handgun during criminal activity. Patterson raised seven issues on appeal:

1. Whether the court-martial lacked subject-matter jurisdiction.

On Jan. 28, 2026, the Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals (NMCCA) issued its decision in United States v. Poller, affirming both the findings and sentence imposed at general court-martial for Hos- pital Corpsman Third Class (E-4) Chase R. Poller. Poller pleaded guilty to multiple violations of Article 134, UCMJ — specifically receiving, possessing, distributing, and producing child pornography — with a resulting sentence of reduction to E-1, 17 years confinement, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and a dishonorable discharge. On appeal, Poller challenged only the severity of the confinement portion of his sentence, arguing for reduction to 12 years. The appellate court rejected the claim and affirmed the findings and sentence as both lawful and correct.

While the NMCCA’s published decision is brief and does not delve into fact patterns in detail, it underscores core appellate standards under the UCMJ — particularly the principles that govern sentencing review and the limited scope of sentence appropriateness arguments in the absence of reversible legal error. This case highlights key concepts every military justice practitioner must understand.

Appellate Standards & Sentence Appropriateness