This site is for the trial practitioner (the military lawyer) of military justice, and for the information of U.S. active duty, Guard, and reserve service-members, their spouses and their families. Our goal is to focus on trial practice issues in cases arising under the UCMJ and being tried at court martial. We hasten to add that nothing on this blog should be taken as specific legal advice for a specific client.

Once again it is the duty of the defense counsel to police the prosecutors not for the prosecutors to police themselves. That is one of the conclusions from the new decision—United States v. Voorhees,

https://www.armfor.uscourts.gov/newcaaf/opinions/2018OctTerm/180372.pdf,

just decided by the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces.

Maybe this guy–AF Captain Josh Traeger (and his leadership) aren’t so great? Will the AF allow him to remain in trial counsel duties?

As trial counsel tried to establish his bona fides with the court members during voir dire, he introduced himself as an attorney of considerable experience and gravitas:

I’m Captain Josh Traeger. I’m a senior trial counsel assigned to Peterson Air Force Base. In that capacity I travel around the world, between 200 and 250 days a year, prosecuting the Air Force’s most serious cases.

Military prisoners may go on MSRP at their MRD unless going into parole. There are many conditions and some consequences for failure to follow the rules. With that in mind, we may need to pay attention and give some thought to:

United States v. Haymond, decided today (26 June 2019) by the Supremes. The opinion is written by Gorsuch. (I’ve linked to SCOTUSBlog so you can the briefs and the opinion.

Some early comment from Prof. Doug Berman — here.

Sommers & Bohm, The Voluntariness of Voluntary Consent: Consent Searches and Psychology of Compliance. 128 YALE L. J. 1962 (2019).

Consent-based searches are by far the most ubiquitous form of search undertaken by police. A key legal inquiry in these cases is whether consent was granted voluntarily. This Essay suggests that fact finders’ assessments of voluntariness are likely to be impaired by a systematic bias in social perception. Fact finders are likely to underappreciate the degree to which suspects feel pressure to comply with police officers’ requests to perform searches.

These findings suggest that decision makers judging the voluntariness of consent consistently underestimate the pressure to comply with intrusive requests. This is problematic because it indicates that a key justification for suspicionless consent searches—that they are voluntary—relies on an assessment that is subject to bias. The results thus provide support to critics who would like to see consent searches banned or curtailed, as they have been in several states.

No. 19-0051/AR. U.S. v. Korey B. Kangich. CCA 20170170. On consideration of the granted issue, 78 M.J. 304 (C.A.A.F. 2019), the judgment of the United States Army Court of Criminal Appeals, United States v. Kangich, No. 20170170 (A. Ct. Crim. App. Sep 27, 2018) (unpublished), and the opinion of this Court in United States v. McDonald, __ M.J. __ (C.A.A.F. Apr. 17, 2019), we conclude that because the affirmative defense of mistake of fact as to consent applies only if the mistake is reasonable as well as honestly held, the military judge did not err. Therefore, it is ordered that the judgment of the United States Army Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed.

This case does not appear on ACCA’s website. LEXIS has the case number as 20170170, and CAAF granted the following issue.

WHETHER THE MILITARY JUDGE ERRED IN APPLYING A NEGLIGENT MENS REA TO MAKE OTHERWISE LAWFUL CONDUCT CRIMINAL.

On September 3, 2014, the Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum providing guidance to the Military Department Boards for Correction of Military/Naval Records (BCM/NR) as they carefully consider each and every petition brought regarding under other than honorable conditions discharge upgrade requests by veterans claiming Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). This includes a comprehensive review of all materials and evidence provided by the applicant.

This policy guidance is intended to ease the application process for veterans who are seeking redress and assist the Boards in reaching fair and consistent results in these cases. The guidance also mandates liberal waivers of time limits, ensures timely consideration of petitions, and allows for increased involvement of medical personnel in Board determinations.

This guidance provides that liberal consideration will be given by Military Department Boards for Correction of Military/Naval Records (BCM/NR) in petitions for changes in characterization of service. The supplemental guidance outlines specifically what type of records and evidence will be given special and liberal consideration by the boards. To read the memorandum and supplemental guidance, please click here.

Prof. Doug Berman of Sentencing Law & Policy brings this tidbit about SOR in Alaska.

[T]he Alaska Supreme Court in Doe v. Alaska Department of Public Safety, No. 7375 (Alaska June 14, 2019) decided that part of its state’s Sexual Offender Registration Act violates due process. Here is how the majority opinion starts and concludes:

This appeal presentstwo questions concerning theAlaska SexualOffender Registration Act (ASORA). The first is whether ASORA’s registration requirements may be imposed on sex offenders who have moved to the state of Alaska after committing sex offenses elsewhere. The second is whether ASOR Aviolates due process by requiring all sex offenders to register without providing a procedure for them to establish that they do not represent a threat to the public. We conclude that ASORA’s registration requirements can constitutionally be applied to out-of-state offenders. We also conclude that ASORA violates due process, but its defect may be cured by providing a procedure for offenders to establish their non-dangerousness….

An accused in pretrial confinement awaiting trial receives day for day credit toward any sentence to confinement. In the old days, we referred to that as “Allen credit.”

Note, an accused may not automatically get credit for time spent in civilian jail–that needs to be litigated at trial. See United States v. Harris, __ M.J. ___, 2019 CAAF LEXIS 361 (C.A.A.F. 2019).

Which brings us to United States v. Howell, NMCCA, 2019. On appeal, Howell argued that the prosecution wrongly argued to nullify his pretrial confinement credit.

Friend and colleague draws attention to McGee v. McFadden, a petition for a writ of certiorari to the U. S. Supreme Court.

Issues: (1) Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit erred when it found no constitutional error when the state failed to disclose Brady evidence, a letter from a jailhouse snitch, until the post-trial hearing for a motion for a new trial; (2) whether the state and federal courts’ decisions were contrary to Giglio v. United StatesUnited States v. BagleyBrady v. Maryland and Napue v. Illinois when the state failed to disclose material impeachment evidence, a letter from a jailhouse snitch who testified that petitioner confessed to him; and (3) whether the state and federal courts erred in finding that trial counsel rendered effective assistance of counsel when he failed to interview Michael Jones and call him as a witness.

More information, including the petition at SCOTUSBlog here.