Experts Category Archives — Page 3 of 9 — Court-Martial Trial Practice Blog Published by International Military Lawyer

Erotic asphyxiation-the choking game

October 17, 2014 | The Law Office of Philip D. Cave

Some years ago I represented a Soldier accused of multiple assaults and rapes of his wife, and of his girlfriends. The rapes allegedly included him choking the complaining witness during the rapes.

He told me – and later the members at his court-martial – that he and his wife consensually engaged in choking during sex as part of rough sex because she liked it. At the time I was already aware of autoerotic behavior, so this didn’t seem too off-the-wall to me as a potential defense. Almost all forensic pathology and death investigations texts have a section on the deadly act of autoeroticism. So I researched “choking during sex” and came across quite a bit of research and current research about the “choking game,” and “erotic asphyxiation.” There is confusion over application ofthe term and the scope of the behavior. There is even a website that describes why, in the writer’s view, women like to be choked during sex, and how to do it properly. Like autoeroticism, the choking game can be deadly or cause serious harm.

Since that case I have had a number of cases where the complaining witness alleges she was choked while being raped, and I have investigated that as a possible defense. I have several appeals now where this issue is clearly presented. But in each of these appellate cases the defense counsel ignored or pooh-pooed the idea that the client was telling the truth about rough sex involving choking and so may have missed a potentially valid defense.

CP distribution?

September 4, 2014 | The Law Office of Philip D. Cave

Prof. Berman at sentecing law and policy invites our attention to an interesting new decision from the Third.

US v. Husmann, No. 13-2688 (3d Cir. Sept 3, 2014) (available here) .

We all of us have an a client who is charged with distribution of CP because they were using a P2P program such as Limewire, and where the automatic settings placed information in the “shared” folder. Because the information is in the shared folder it is accessible to others who search Limewire and come across it. Actually many clients have been caught through the FBI or some other enforcement agency trolling Limewire for such information.

Two years of federal evidence

January 20, 2014 | The Law Office of Philip D. Cave

Once again one of my two favorite evidence blogs (federal evidence review) has published the annual “review” for 2013 and for 2014.

Key Evidence Issues During 2013

1. Supreme Court Watch: Fifth Amendment (Self-Incrimination Clause): Kansas v. Cheever: Allowing The Government To “Follow” Where The Defense Leads On Defense Expert Mental State Evidence

A little more on forensics

January 14, 2014 | The Law Office of Philip D. Cave

It is unusual in military cases to have evidence of microscopic hair analysis. But, it’s worth keeping up on, just in case. Also, the point below is further substantiation of the National Academy of Sciences critique of forensic “science” evidence. A 2009 news release on the NSA report had this to say:

A congressionally mandated report from the National Research Council finds serious deficiencies in the nation’s forensic science system and calls for major reforms and new research. Rigorous and mandatory certification programs for forensic scientists are currently lacking, the report says, as are strong standards and protocols for analyzing and reporting on evidence. And there is a dearth of peer-reviewed, published studies establishing the scientific bases and reliability of many forensic methods. Moreover, many forensic science labs are underfunded, understaffed, and have no effective oversight.

Interestingly, in April 2009, before the NSA report was released, the FBI published a short piece about hair examination, which seems to support the reliability of MHE.

Confrontation and lab reports

April 6, 2013 | The Law Office of Philip D. Cave

Here is an interesting opinion regarding expert testimony in DNA examinations.

Young v. United States, in the DC Court of Appeals.

Crawford and forensics

April 5, 2013 | The Law Office of Philip D. Cave

Here is a piece by two titans of science in the courtr00m, with due deference to my former evidence professor, Paul Gianelli.

Confronting Science: Expert Evidence and the Confrontation Clause

Jennifer Mnookin

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) – School of Law

David H. Kaye

Penn State Law
February 23, 2013
Supreme Court Review, Forthcoming
Penn State Law Research Paper No. 11-2013
UCLA School of Law Research Paper No. 13-08

Abstract:
In Crawford v Washington, the Supreme Court substantially changed its understanding of how the Confrontation Clause applies to hearsay evidence. Since then, the Court has issued three bitterly contested expert-evidence-related Confrontation Clause decisions, and each one has generated at least as many questions as answers. This article analyzes this trilogy of cases, especially the most recent, Williams v Illinois.
In Williams, the Court issued a bewildering array of opinions in which majority support for admitting the opinion of a DNA analyst about tests that she did not perform was awkwardly knitted together out of several incompatible doctrinal bases. The most prominent and fully developed argument for admission was that the references to the work of the analysts who actually did the testing but who never testified were admitted for a purpose other than their truth. Although we maintain that this argument is, on the facts of Williams, implausible, we also recognize that in other, relatively limited instances, expert basis evidence might legitimately be introduced for a purpose other than its truth.
After striving for precision on this doctrinal point, we step back and suggest that the ongoing anxiety about how to think about expert evidence and the Confrontation Clause exists in large part because the Court has yet to face directly a set of larger, background concerns. There is significant uncertainty about how, and to what extent, scientific evidence should be treated as special or distinct from other kinds of evidence for confrontation purposes. We suggest that scientific and expert evidence might warrant some limited special treatment, based on what we see as one of the most critical dimensions of scientific knowledge production — that it is a collective, rather than an individual enterprise. Recognizing that scientists inevitably rely and build on facts, data, opinions, and test results of others, we suggest that courts should engage in a modest form of scientific exceptionalism within Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, through efforts to create procedures that respect the fundamental values of the Confrontation Clause, but also adapt when necessary, to the epistemic structures and processes of science.

The Perils of Eyewitness Testimony

January 25, 2013 | The Law Office of Philip D. Cave

Eyewitness Memory for People and Events (Chapter 25)

Gary L. Wells

Iowa State University, Department of Psychology

Elizabeth F. Loftus

University of California, Irvine – Department of Psychology and Social Behavior
January 16, 2013
Handbook of Psychology, Vol. 11, 2013, Forensic Psychology, Chapter 25, R.K. Otto and & I.B. Weiner (Eds), Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
UC Irvine School of Law Research Paper No. 2013-88

Abstract:
This chapter begins with a summary of the case of Thomas Brewster, who was tried for murder based in large part on eyewitness testimony. Ultimately DNA came to Brewster’s rescue, and he was freed before the trial ended. Analyses of taped interviews in the case help reveal how the interviewing process itself may have tainted the eyewitness testimony. The chapter continues with discussions of new psychological research on memory for complex events. This work shows how the details of events can be changed when witnesses are exposed to post-event information that is misleading. And with enough suggestion, entire events can be planted into the mind of ordinary healthy adults. The final section discusses new findings concerning eyewitness memory for people. This includes eyewitness identification of previously seen strangers, and new findings on procedures that can reduce mistaken identifications.

Resources in forensics bias from a different perspective

December 9, 2012 | The Law Office of Philip D. Cave

I have mentioned this article before, Michael D. Risinger, Navigating Expert Reliability: Are Criminal Standards of Certainty Being Left in the Dock?, 64 ALBANY L. REV. 99 (2000). The basic theme:

This article shows that, as to proffers of asserted expert testimony, civil defendants win their Daubert reliability challenges to plaintiffs’ proffers most of the time, and that criminal defendants virtually always lose their reliability challenges to government proffers. And, when civil defendants’ proffers are challenged by plaintiffs, those defendants usually win, but when criminal defendants’ proffers are challenged by the prosecution, the criminal defendants usually lose. The article then goes on to examine, in detail, various categories of expert proffers in criminal cases, including “syndrome evidence,” polygraph, bite mark, handwriting, modus operandi, and eyewitness weakness, to shed light on whether the system bias revealed in the statistical breakdown is illusory or real. Finally, an afterword analyzes the last year’s cases, and makes observations on apparent trends.

I revisited the above because of reading today’s post on on the Concurring Opinions blog, about “Convicting the Innocent.” There is a comment to the post by Prof. Garrett asking, “if there is a double standard in forensics concerning exculpatory versus inculpatory evidence?”

Forensics

December 1, 2012 | The Law Office of Philip D. Cave

Here is a link to a useful site all about DNA.

And here is a link to the NIJ forensics site.

The Ayes have it

November 30, 2012 | The Law Office of Philip D. Cave

The Supreme Court of Oregon has revisited its 30-year old rule that allowed for admission of eyewitness identification resulting from “unduly suggestive pretrial identification procedures.”

State v. Lawson consolidates two cases on the same issue, and decides en banc to recognize significant changes in the understanding and science of eyewitness identification.

The court discussed State v. Classen and its two-step five (nonexclusive) factors to consider whether an identification was “independent of suggestive procedures.” Classen had relied on Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977), wherein the Supremes “determined that reliability was the linchpin in determinations regarding the admissibility of identification testimony.”