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The respondent in Michigan v. Bryant has filed his brief and is found here courtesy of Professor Friedman (who indicates a likely amicus filing on his part).

Here is the QP:

Whether preliminary inquiries of a wounded citizen concerning the perpetrator and circumstances of the shooting are nontestimonial because they were “made under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency,” including not only aid to a wounded victim, but also the prompt identification and apprehension of an apparently violent and dangerous individual?

Sad to say some homecomings are not that good.  As a CV SJA we always prepared for extra legal assistance business upon return from an extended at sea period.  In one instance after cruise one Sailor returned “home” to find himself locked out and a stranger answering his “knocks.”  Sad to say the spouse had – well — moved out and taken everything.  So in some sense I’m not surprised with this report from Army Times.

A woman has been charged with bigamy for allegedly marrying another soldier while her husband was deployed to Iraq.

TBO.online reports that:

The soldier who tried to get into MacDill Air Force Base with a fake ID and a car full of weapons and ammunition is being transferred back to the Kansas fort he ran away from, according to the U.S. Army.

Christopher P. Kilburn, 26, was assigned to Fort Riley on April 30, 2009. He was reported AWOL on April 6 and dropped from the personnel rolls of the unit May 6, according to a news release from Fort Riley.

I first posted on this here.  More information about the case is seeping out.  Some of this may be circular reporting.

Fox5News (Las Vegas) reports:

The Army isn’t saying what motivated the killings of three Afghan civilians, whose deaths have led to charges against a Nevada soldier and four others from Washington state’s Joint Base Lewis-McChord.

Savannahnow.com reports that:

Attorneys for a 3rd Infantry Division soldier accused of shooting two non-commissioned officers while all three men were deployed to Iraq in 2008 are asking a military judge to drop capital charges in a pending court-martial.

They claim two aggravating circumstances surrounding the incident were not properly listed on the suspect’s initial charge sheet.  [They] also asked Military Judge Col. Tara Osborn for five peremptory challenges against potential jury members in the capital court-martial proceedings.

Navy Times reports:

hutchins4.23th.jpg
Photo: AP/Navy Times

A military judge has allowed a Marine sergeant convicted of murder in one of the biggest war crimes cases to emerge from the Iraq war to walk free, nearly two months after a military appeals court ruled he had an unfair trial. . . . Hutchins had been serving an 11-year sentence. The others in his squad served less than 18 months.

Here is a link to the en banc United States v. Hutchins at NMCCA.

Here is CAAF’s journal entry for the certification for 7 June 2010.

No. 10-5003/MC. U.S., Appellant v. Lawrence G. HUTCHINS, Appellee. CCA 200800393.

Notice is hereby given that a certificate for review of the decision of the United States Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals was filed under Rule 22 on this date on the following issues:

WHETHER THE NAVY-MARINE CORPS COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING, INTER ALIA, THAT THE MILITARY JUDGE SEVERED THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP WITH CAPTAIN BASS?

WHETHER UNDER R.C.M. 505(d)(2)(B), THE NAVY-MARINE CORPS COURT INCORRECTLY FOUND NO “GOOD CAUSE” ON THE RECORD FOR THE REPLACEMENT OF APPELLANT’S SECOND DETAILED DEFENSE COUNSEL WITH ANOTHER COUNSEL?

WHETHER THE LOWER COURT APPLIED THE WRONG STANDARD AND ERRONEOUSLY PRESUMED, WITHOUT ASSESSING, PREJUDICE AND SET ASIDE THE FINDINGS AND SENTENCE, WHERE APPELLANT’S STATUTORY RIGHTS, AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, WERE SATISFIED THROUGHOUT TRIAL?

Appellant will file a brief in accordance with Rule 24 in support of the certified issues on or before the July 7, 2010. Appellee will file an answer no later than 30 days after the filing of Appellant’s brief. A reply to Appellee’s answer may be filed by the Appellant no later than 10 days after the filing of Appellee’s answer.

Dwight Sullivan says:

CCA opinions, CAAF has held, are inchoate and need not be given effect for 30 days as the government decides whether to seek reconsideration and the Judge Advocate General decides whether to certify the case to CAAF.  But CAAF has also held that when a CCA rules to free the accused, that decision will be given effect in 30 days even if the Judge Advocate General does certify the case.  So in the case of a confined servicemember who would be freed as the result of the CCA’s opinion, the government must either release him or treat him as a pretrial detainee, thus providing the right to an IRO hearing.  See generally United States v. Miller, 47 M.J. 352 (C.A.A.F. 1997).

In Miller the AFTJAG certification included the following issues:

II. WHETHER OPINIONS OF THE AIR FORCE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS ARE SELF-EXECUTING.

III. WHETHER, PRIOR TO THE EXPIRATION OF THE TIME PERIOD DURING WHICH RECONSIDERATION CAN BE REQUESTED OR CERTIFICATION BY THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL SOUGHT, AN AIR FORCE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OPINION IS “FINAL” OR REMAINS “INCHOATE.”

IV. WHETHER ARMY OFFICIALS PREMATURELY SOUGHT TO RELEASE APPELLEE FROM THE UNITED STATES DISCIPLINARY BARRACKS BASED UPON UNOFFICIAL NOTIFICATION BY DEFENSE COUNSEL OF AN INCHOATE, NON-SELF-EXECUTING OPINION OF THE AIR FORCE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS WITH NO DIRECTION FROM A CONVENING AUTHORITY AS REQUIRED BY ARTICLE 66(e), UCMJ.

Miller held that:

The decisions of this Court and the court below are “not self-executing.” United States v. Kraffa, 11 M.J. 453, 455 (CMA 1981)(holding that “[a] decision of the Court of Military Review, 2 however, is not self-executing. The court issues no mandate, but its decision is forwarded to the convening authority for further action.”); United States v. Tanner, 3 M.J. 924, 926 (ACMR 1977) (holding that “neither the decisions nor the opinions of appellate courts, however, are self-executing; cases must be returned to those lower levels where officials and parties can be ordered to implement the court’s judgment”). The Judicial Branch is not an executive arm but depends on the Judge Advocate General and lower officials to execute its orders.

CAAF then discusses what happens depending on what action TJAG decides to take, or not take.

There have been instances in the past where a commander has refused to follow the judicial order to release an accused.  See e.g. Frage v. Moriarity.

The release does not mean that Hutchins cannot be re-confined if CAAF reverses NMCCA.  In that event the issue will be what credit, if any, he receives for “confinement served” between the date of this release and his being reconfined.  The answer may be none.

Marine Corps Times reports that:

A Camp Pendleton Marine whose murder conviction was recently overturned was released Monday after serving four years in prison for a major Iraqi war crimes case, his lawyer said.

An emotional Sgt. Lawrence Hutchins III vowed to be the best Marine he could be while he waits for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces to review his case, defense lawyer Babu Kaza told The Associated Press after leaving the closed hearing at Camp Pendleton.

United States v. Daly.

Initially the accused was charged with violating a CG Personnel Manual regulation (about personal relationships) under Article 134, UCMJ.  After some discussion of preemption issues (Dwight-san?), the charge was amended to remove the violation of a lawful order language.  Then the defense challenged the charge on the basis of failure to state an offense and notice.  After litigating the issue the military judge dismissed the charges, and the government appealed.

There is an interesting discussion of the CG Personnel Manual’s categorization of personal relationships into acceptable, unacceptable, and prohibited.  Apparently the evidence put the accused’s conduct into the unacceptable.  Unacceptable conduct is to be dealt with administratively only.

CAAFLog has posted a link to the denial of certiorari in Pendergrass v. Indiana.  When the Supremes, or any appellate court, denies a petition this is what I usually think of.  Probably need to update my trial notebook because there must be a more recent “quote?”  Stern & Gressman must be past a 7th edition?

[D]enial of a petition for writ of certiorari . . . simply means that fewer than four members of the Court deemed it desirable to review a decision of the lower court as a matter "of sound judicial discretion." A variety of considerations underlie denials of the writ, and as to the same petition different reasons may lead different Justices to the same result.. . . Inasmuch, therefore,  all that a denial of a petition for a writ of certiorari means is that fewer than four members of the Court thought it should be granted, this Court has rigorously insisted that such a denial carries with it no implication whatever regarding the Court’s views on the merits of a case which it has declined to review. The Court has said this again and again; again and again the admonition has to be repeated.  United States v. Carver, 260 U.S. 482 (1923).  See also, Evans and Jordan v. Stephens, et. al., 544 U.S. 942, n.1 (2005)("Nothing is more basic to the functioning of this Court than an understanding that denial of certiorari is occasioned by a variety of reasons which precludes the implication that were the case here the merits would go against the petitioner"); and see, Stern & Gressman, Supreme Court Practice, 7th ed., para. 5.7.

So, what will CAAF do about Blazier?

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