Articles Posted in Evidence

Michael H. Graham (University of Miami – School of Law) has posted two articles on "other crimes" evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) on SSRN. The first is Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Culpable Acts, Fed.R.Evid. 404(B): ‘Defining’ a New Paradigm (Criminal Law Bulletin, Vol. 47, p. 998, 2011). Here is the abstract:

Commentators addressing the incredible theoretical and functional difficulties surrounding the long accepted general principal that while other crimes, wrongs, or culpable acts are not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith, such evidence may “be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident,” Fed.R.Evid. 404(b), have more or less thrown in the towel reverting to the bromide that fundamentally it all is a question of proper application of discretionary balancing, basically some version or another of Fed.R.Evid. 403. Such an approach is recommended by those adopting a totally theoretical approach to the enterprise as well not surprisingly also by the two commentators, Imwinkelried and Leonard, who have authored treatises devoted solely to the subject.

The second is Reconciling Inextricably Intertwined/Intricately Related Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Culpable Acts Evidence with Fed.R.Evid. 404(B): Don’t Throw the Baby Out With the Bath Water (Criminal Law Bulletin, Vol. 47, p. 1258, 2011). Here is the abstract:

Eyewitness Memory for People and Events (Chapter 25)

Gary L. Wells

Iowa State University, Department of Psychology

Elizabeth F. Loftus

University of California, Irvine – Department of Psychology and Social Behavior
January 16, 2013
Handbook of Psychology, Vol. 11, 2013, Forensic Psychology, Chapter 25, R.K. Otto and & I.B. Weiner (Eds), Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
UC Irvine School of Law Research Paper No. 2013-88

Abstract:
This chapter begins with a summary of the case of Thomas Brewster, who was tried for murder based in large part on eyewitness testimony. Ultimately DNA came to Brewster’s rescue, and he was freed before the trial ended. Analyses of taped interviews in the case help reveal how the interviewing process itself may have tainted the eyewitness testimony. The chapter continues with discussions of new psychological research on memory for complex events. This work shows how the details of events can be changed when witnesses are exposed to post-event information that is misleading. And with enough suggestion, entire events can be planted into the mind of ordinary healthy adults. The final section discusses new findings concerning eyewitness memory for people. This includes eyewitness identification of previously seen strangers, and new findings on procedures that can reduce mistaken identifications.

Similar to its federal counterpart, Minnesota Rule of Evidence 803(6) provides an exception to the rule against hearsay for

A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to make the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness, unless the source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness.

After he was convicted, the appellant appealed, claiming, inter alia, that the State failed to lay a proper foundation for admission of the transaction journal as a business record under Minnesota Rule of Evidence 803(6).

As noted in yesterday’s post, Federal Rule of Evidence 414(a),

In a criminal case in which a defendant is accused of child molestation, the court may admit evidence that the defendant committed any other child molestation. The evidence may be considered on any matter to which it is relevant.

So, what exactly counts as "child molestation" for Rule 414(a) purposes? Let’s take a look at the recent opinion of the United States District Court for the District of Utah in United States v. Gardner, 2013 WL 53845 (D.Utah 2013).

I’ve posted already about the Oregon case – Oregon v. Lawson.

Here is a piece from the excellent Concurring Opinions blog about eyewitness testimony.

I would like to underscore Brandon’s point about reform efforts that are currently underway. While for the most part, the criminal justice process is stuck in a bad place (thanks to a large degree to the US Supreme Court), it is refreshing to note that a few local and state jurisdictions are moving ahead with thoughtful reforms.

Prof. Berman notes a unique “stale” murder/rape case in Illinois.

Speaking of the Supreme Court, two recent rulings by the Justices, Gall and Pepper, made much of considering under federal sentencing law the positive post-offense behavior by a defendant. In this case, it seems the defendant was a model citizen for more than five decades, during which time he apparently served our country in the armed services and served his local community as a police officer.

To some extent military courts already factor positive post-offense service as a sentencing consideration – it can be mitigating and show rehabilitative potential under R.C.M. 1001.

I have mentioned this article before, Michael D. Risinger, Navigating Expert Reliability:  Are Criminal Standards of Certainty Being Left in the Dock?, 64 ALBANY L. REV. 99 (2000).  The basic theme:

This article shows that, as to proffers of asserted expert testimony, civil defendants win their Daubert reliability challenges to plaintiffs’ proffers most of the time, and that criminal defendants virtually always lose their reliability challenges to government proffers. And, when civil defendants’ proffers are challenged by plaintiffs, those defendants usually win, but when criminal defendants’ proffers are challenged by the prosecution, the criminal defendants usually lose. The article then goes on to examine, in detail, various categories of expert proffers in criminal cases, including “syndrome evidence,” polygraph, bite mark, handwriting, modus operandi, and eyewitness weakness, to shed light on whether the system bias revealed in the statistical breakdown is illusory or real.  Finally, an afterword analyzes the last year’s cases, and makes observations on apparent trends.

I revisited the above because of reading today’s post on on the Concurring Opinions blog, about “Convicting the Innocent.”  There is a comment to the post by Prof. Garrett asking, “if there is a double standard in forensics concerning exculpatory versus inculpatory evidence?”

Many years ago we sought to improve our counsel performance at NLSO Norfolk with developing checklists, protocols, and a PQS system.  It seemed to work.

Now here is an article, Darryl K. Brown, Defense Counsel, Trial Judges, and Evidence Protocols, Brown, Darryl K., Defense Counsel, Trial Judges, and Evidence Protocols, Texas Tech Law Review, Vol. 45, No. 1, 2012; Virginia Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper, 2012-70. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2181301.  The author

argues that constitutional criminal adjudication provisions are fruitfully viewed not primarily as defendant rights but as procedural components that, when employed, maximize the odds that adversarial adjudication will succeed in its various goals, notably accurate judgments. On this view, the state has an interest in how those procedural mechanisms, especially regarding fact investigation and evidence gathering, are invoked or implemented. Deficient attorney performance, on this view, can be taken as a problem of the state’s adversarial adjudication process, for which public officials – notably judges, whose judgments depend on that process – should assume greater responsibility. The essay briefly sketches how judicial responsibility for the integrity of criminal judgments is minimized in various Sixth Amendment doctrines and aspects of adversarial practice. Then, instead of looking to Sixth Amendment doctrine to enforce minimal standards for attorney performance, the essay suggests that judges could improve routine adversarial process through modest steps to more closely supervise attorneys’ performance without infringing their professional discretion or adversarial role. One such step involves use of protocols, or checklists, through which judges would have attorneys confirm that they have performed some of their tasks essential to adversarial adjudication, such as fact investigation, before the court would rely on their performance to reach a judgment, whether through plea bargaining or trial.

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