Articles Tagged with counsel

An accused has a limited right to counsel in the military.  A very common event for defense counsel is PCS, release from active duty, and orders to deployment.  Marine Corps Times reports:

A military appeals court has thrown out the 2007 conviction of a Marine infantry squad leader accused of murdering an innocent man in the Iraqi town of Hamdaniya.

Pvt. Lawrence G. Hutchins III, a former sergeant now serving an 11-year sentence in the military prison at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., will be released from confinement if the Navy does not appeal the court’s Thursday ruling, his attorney, Capt. Babu Kaza, told Marine Corps Times. However, Hutchins also could face a new set of charges if the Marine Corps wants to readdress his case.

There are a number of ways denial of counsel of choice can come up, most frequently related to the availability of civilian counsel.  Here’s an interesting one.

United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140 (2006).  The opinion is written by Justice Scalia.  Here are the important part of the opinion:

In sum, the right at stake here is the right to counsel of choice, not the right to a fair trial; and that right was violated because the deprivation of counsel was erroneous. No additional showing of prejudice is required to make the violation "complete."

Jenny Roberts, Ignorance Is Effectively Bliss: Collateral Consequences, Silence, and Misinformation in the Guilty-Plea Process, 95 IOWA L. R. 119 (2009).

ABSTRACT: In the 2009–2010 term, the U.S. Supreme Court will decide if it matters whether a criminal defense lawyer correctly counsels a client about the fact that the client faces deportation as a result of a guilty plea. Under prevailing constitutional norms in almost every jurisdiction, a lawyer does not have a duty to tell her client about many serious but “collateral” consequences of a guilty plea. Yet, in every jurisdiction that has considered the issue, that very same lawyer will run afoul of her duties if she affirmatively misrepresents a collateral consequence—every jurisdiction, that is, except Kentucky. The Supreme Court of Kentucky recently held that when there is no duty to warn about a consequence because it is collateral, misadvice about that same consequence is not a constitutional violation.

The collision of the collateral-consequences rule, which imposes no duty to warn, and the affirmative-misadvice exception, which imposes a duty to give accurate advice where a lawyer chooses to warn, leads to a perverse incentive structure that signals to defense lawyers (as well as to prosecutors and judges) that it is safest to say nothing at all about “collateral” matters. The Kentucky approach that the Supreme Court will review is equally troubling; it allows false information with no sanction or remedy. A cluttered and contradictory jurisprudence of informational rights in the guilty-plea process sits at this intersection of the collateral-consequences rule and affirmative-misadvice exception.
So-called collateral consequences often overshadow the direct penal sentences in criminal cases. In addition to deportation, courts categorize many other severe consequences as collateral, including involuntary civil commitment, sex-offender registration, and loss of the right to vote, to obtain professional licenses, and to receive public housing and benefits. These consequences touch upon every important area of a convicted person’s life—for the rest of his or her life. They also matter enormously in the United States, which has more than 600,000 individuals exiting the prison system and millions more getting criminal records each year. These individuals enter a society that is struggling to find ways to integrate them despite facing considerable obstacles.

Contact Information