We don’t have this come up too often because of the nature of our clients.

Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38 (1984), held that if a trial court determines that the prosecution will be able to impeach a defendant through his prior convictions under Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a) in the event that he testifies at trial, the defendant only preserves that issue for appeal if he testifies at trial.

On a different point entirely, don’t rely on old westerns like “High Noon” as a substitute for expert testimony on a relevant point.  (h/t federalevidence.com)

We all know that a defense counsel (and for that matter trial counsel) should not trust what comes out of a military drug lab, USACIL, or DCFL – I won’t rehash the problems over the years – which may well be continuing.  While the problems have been substantial, DOD and courts have been quite happy to rely on the various “forensic” labs to put or keep people in jail.

So, why does this surprise me.

“Review Found FBI Hair Analysis Flaws in 250 Cases, But DOJ Didn’t Inform Defendants and Public (does this sound like USACIL or what)” says the ABA Journal. 

SBS has been subject to significant criticism, so the “experts” have changed it’s name to Abusive Head Trauma.  But does a name change mean that the “syndrome” or “diagnosis” is any more real?

Shaken Baby Syndrome, Abusive Head Trauma, and Actual Innocence: Getting It Right

Keith A. Findley University of Wisconsin Law School

Now that the current slew of confrontation cases are decided it’s time to regroup.

Let’s start with my former evidence professor, Paul Gianelli (a former Army JA).

Confrontation, Experts, and Rule 703

From my very first opinion on this Court, I have consistently concluded that Mil.R.Evid. 410 must be applied broadly to be consistent with its purpose. United States v. Barunas, 23 M.J. 71, 75-76 (CMA 1986). See also Fed.R.Evid. 410. Speaking for the Court in Barunas, I said:

The general purpose of Mil.R.Evid. 410 and its federal civilian counterpart, Fed.R.Evid. 410, is to encourage the flow of information during the plea-bargaining process and the resolution of criminal charges without "full-scale" trials. See United States v. Grant, 622 F.2d [308,] at 313 [(8th Cir. Ark. 1980)]; see generally Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260-61, 92 S. Ct. 495, 497-98, 30 L. Ed. 2d 427 (1971). An excessively formalistic or technical approach to this rule may undermine these policy concerns in the long run. United States v. Herman, 544 F.2d [791,] at 797 [(5th Cir. Fla. 1977)].See generally Wright and Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure: Evidence § 5345 (1980). A failure to recognize and enforce the military expansion of this rule may have the same effect.  23 M.J. at 76.

United States v. Anderson, 55 M.J. 182 (C.A.A.F. 2001)(Sullivan, J., concurring).

I think it fair to consider Mil. R. Evid. 410 a form of privilege although not found in the 500 series of rules.  Fourthamendment.com notes an interesting case about application of Fed. R. Evid. 410.  In reading the case it appears the federal courts may take a more restrictive view of the rule compared to application of Mil. R. Evid. 410.

Contact Information