Not unexpected but it looks like the former CO, MCAS Cheery Point may be headed to court-martial. See jdnews.com and Eyewitness News 9. The EW9 reports that he pleaded guilty in civilian court yesterday.
Apparently there are additional issues, such as flying too soon after drinking.
Like the new format www.armfor.uscourts.gov.
Houston Chronicle reports: An Army witness who says he stumbled onto a fellow soldier killing a U.S. superior at their patrol base in Iraq testified Monday he thought he was running toward nighttime enemy fire as he responded to gunshots — until he heard the shooter shout “I’ll kill you” in English and saw his face illuminated by his flashing rifle. Sgt. Joseph Bozicevich, 41, of Minneapolis, faces a possible death sentence[.]
Florida Wires reports that: An Army judge has ordered a recess in the court-martial of a Fort Stewart sergeant charged with murder in the 2008 slayings of a superior and a fellow U.S. soldier in Iraq. Prosecutors rested their case against 41-year-old Sgt. Joseph Bozicevich (BOZ-eh-vich) of Minneapolis on Tuesday after two weeks of testimony. The judge has instructed Bozicevich’s attorneys to open their defense next Tuesday. The decision to take a break in the case was prompted by Fort Stewart’s training calendar. Troops at the Georgia Army post have a four-day weekend coming up, with days off Friday and Monday, to give them extra leave around Mother’s Day. [No doubt the defense will get a short weekend.]
‘Waiving’ Goodbye to Rights: Plea Bargaining and the Defense Dilemma of Competent Representation
Jane Campbell Moriarty
University of Akron School of Law
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly, Vol. 38, No. 4, 2011
U of Akron Legal Studies Research Paper No. 11-7
Abstract:
The proposed amendments to the ABA Criminal Justice Standards for Prosecutors and Defense Lawyers ("Proposed Standards") address a number of problematic issues related to the roles of both prosecutors and defense attorneys. This Symposium Article considers waiver of rights in the context of the Standards, focusing on guilty pleas and the so-called "preconditions" that prosecutors generally require before even entertaining the defendant’s proffer, colloquially termed "Queen for a Day" agreements It reviews the development in the law since 1993, the changes in the practice since that time, and the proposed changes to the Standards. The article focuses on the complex obligations of criminal defense attorneys to investigate their cases and give competent advice to their clients in the shadow of proffers and pleas. It concludes that attorneys in this role face an almost insoluble dilemma and hopes that the Proposed Standards provide an important first step to resolving it.
Our SANE reporter at Obama Conspiracy Theories has this, which is a potential welcome home poster for LTC Lakin on 14 May.
Deborah Tuerkheimer, Science-Dependent Prosecution and the Problem of Epistemic Contingency: A Study of Shaken Baby Syndrome, 62 ALABAMA L. REV. 513 (2011).
With rare exception, SBS prosecutions rest entirely on the testimony of medical experts.
The construction of crime in this manner is rather extraordinary, particularly since— as a general proposition—scientific understandings develop over time. In the specific context of SBS, dramatic changes have occurred since the 1990s, when the prosecution template emerged. While forensic claims on this area remain highly contested, the science underlying SBS has decisively evolved. By this, I mean both that the evidentiary basis for SBS has been effectively challenged18 and—notwithstanding outstanding points of dispute—that large and highly significant areas of consensus surrounding SBS have shifted. Three areas of changed consensus are, from a criminal justice perspective, of critical importance.
On 21 October 2008 the NMCCA decided and affirmed in United States v. Burleson, 2008 CCA LEXIS 386. In the original case he was sentenced to: The appellant was sentenced to 20 years confinement, total forfeitures, reduction to pay grade E-1, and a dishonorable discharge. The convening authority approved the sentence as adjudged.
On 18 May 2010, CAAF reversed in part and sent the case back to NMCCA for sentence reassessment or a rehearing. Apparently NMCCA sent the case back for a rehearing.
On further consideration of the granted issue (68 M.J. 163) in light of United States v. Jones, 68 M.J. 465, 2010 CAAF LEXIS 393 (C.A.A.F. 2010), we hold that indecent assault under Article 134, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 934 (2006), is not a lesser included offense of rape under Article 120, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 920 (2006).
On concurringopinions blog Daniel Solove, flogs his new book, NOTHING TO HIDE: THE FALSE TRADEOFF BETWEEN PRIVACY AND SECURITY (Yale University Press, May 2011).
This book grows out of an essay I wrote a few years ago about the Nothing-to-Hide Argument. The essay’s popularity surprised me and made me realize that there is a hunger out there for discussions about the arguments made in the debate between privacy and security.
The primary focus of NOTHING TO HIDE is on critiquing common pro-security arguments. I’ve given them nifty names such as the “Luddite Argument,”the “War-Powers Argument,” the “All-or-Nothing Argument,” the “Suspicionless-Searches Argument,” the “Deference Argument,” and the “Pendulum Argument,” among others. I also discuss concrete issues of law and technology, such as the Fourth Amendment Third Party Doctrine, the First Amendment, electronic surveillance statutes, the USA-Patriot Act, the NSA surveillance program, and government data mining.
Here is another Fasler trailer. Until Fasler is resolved the prosecution should be pleading in accordance with the issue in Fasler – what’s the harm – it’s a few extra words.
WHETHER AN ARTICLE 134 CLAUSE 1 OR 2 SPECIFICATION THAT FAILS TO EXPRESSLY ALLEGE EITHER POTENTIAL TERMINAL ELEMENT STATES AN OFFENSE UNDER THE SUPREME COURT’S HOLDINGS IN UNITED STATES v. RESENDIZ-PONCE AND RUSSELL v. UNITED STATES, AND THIS COURT’S RECENT OPINIONS INMEDINA, MILLER, AND JONES.
What do you do, if anything, if your client confesses to a crime for which he is not charged, but someone else is, or where someone else has already been convicted. Not a common practice in the military, or is it. What about the multi-accused drug case for example?
Here’s an interesting article about the potential ethics of that “problem.” Professor Coline Miller posts about: Jean Fleming Powers’ Comparing Exceptions to Privilege and Confidentiality Relating to Crime, Fraud, and Harm—Can Hard Cases Make Good Law?
Professor Miller concludes that there is a reason to avoid the client-attorney privilege in such a case if there is (substantial?) harm to the other client. Based on his argument his point is limited to the convicted person, not the one on trial and not yet convicted.
Court-Martial Trial Practice Blog
