Articles Posted in Discovery

As we see frequently, texts and messages on cellphones can be important evidence in a case.  Most of the time the MCIO’s merely got the CW to provide a screenshot and otherwise cherry-pick what they want to take as evidence in the beginning.  Of course the cherry-picking is in favor of the CW and they ignore what might be Brady-plus material.  True, I’m starting to see more MCIO’s do a Cellbrite extraction, which is good.

United States v. Pham from the NMCCA teaches us that we need to be precise in what we ask for when we are seeking the CW’s phone.

Here, the CW “voluntarily provided her cell phone, a Samsung Galaxy S-IV, to NCIS for forensic examination. NCIS investigators performed a logical extraction of the phone and returned it to PI the same day. In response to a January 2016 defense discovery request for a copy of the physical extraction” the defense got “a logical extraction performed 11 months earlier.”

All current rape and serious sexual assault cases in England and Wales are to be reviewed “as a matter of urgency” to ensure evidence has been disclosed.

Director of Public Prosecutions Alison Saunders warned the review could see “a number of cases” dropped.

It comes after the collapse of several rape trials because evidence had not been shared with defence lawyers.

[V]iolations of Brady are the most recurring and pervasive of all constitutional procedural violations, with disastrous consequences: innocent people are wrongfully convicted; the reputation of U.S. prosecutors suffer; and the absence of meaningful legal and ethical enforcement and accountability has a corrosive effect on the public’s perception of a justice system that often appears to be arbitrary, unjust, and simply unreliable.

Bennett L. Gershman, Litigating Brady v. Maryland: Games Prosecutors Play, 57 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 13, 15 (2007).

At SimpleJustice blog (a blog worth following) there is a piece about Judge Kopf and a tweet which leads to a discussion of a prosecutors obligation to provide discovery to the defense.

Let me start with some basics and two cases that prosecutors and defense lawyers know (or should know) well. In Brady v. Maryland, the Supreme Court held that suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. Evidence is “material” if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.

Relatedly, in Giglio v. United States, the Supreme Court held that prosecutors must disclose to the defense any “understanding or agreement as to a future prosecution” that the government has made with a material witness. That notion has been expanded to requiring the production of impeachment information of a material character. Specifically, this is thought of as information that either casts a substantial doubt upon the accuracy of any evidence—including witness testimony—the prosecutor intends to rely on to prove an element of any crime charged, or might have a significant bearing on the admissibility of prosecution evidence.

The Virginia legislature has passed SB1563.  There are several provisions which should be adopted in military cases.

D. Whenever the Commonwealth intends to introduce expert opinion testimony at trial, the attorney for the Commonwealth shall notify in writing the accused of the Commonwealth’s intent to present such testimony not later than 14 days before trial, or as otherwise ordered by the court. The notice shall include the witness’s name and contact information, a summary of the witness’s qualifications, the substance of the facts and opinions to which the witness is expected to testify, a summary of the grounds for each opinion, and copies of written reports, if any, prepared by the witness.

There is a reciprocal requirement for the defense.  The new VA rule is consistent with federal practice under Fed. R. Crim. Pro 16(a)(G), and with then Judge D. Vowell (Army) in her court-martial scheduling orders.

There is an excellent post at Volokh Conspiracy.

Here’s the problem in a nutshell: So much at trial can turn on the testimony of a police officer. For a criminal defendant, life and liberty may depend on the ability to impeach the officer’s testimony. The federal constitution, as interpreted by Brady v. Maryland and its progeny, requires prosecutors to disclose to defendants any favorable, material evidence known to the prosecution team, including evidence relating to a witness’s credibility. Much impeachment evidence can be found in a police officer’s personnel file. But in many jurisdictions, a thicket of state laws, local policies, and bare-knuckle political pressure prevents access to the material in these personnel files, despite the federal constitutional requirement to disclose. In the name of protecting police privacy, criminal defendants are denied their due process rights to a fair trial.

Here’s what I ask for in my discovery requests.

The Guardian reports, Detective criticised for ‘getting too close’ in alleged rape case, 9 May 2016.

A senior judge has criticised a police detective and the Crown Prosecution Service for their handling of an accusation of gang rape after the case against four young men collapsed just as their trial was due to begin.

Judge Jamie Tabor QC said DC Ben Lewis of Gloucestershire police had got too close to the complainant and did not understand his job properly.

Amici are former federal prosecutors and senior Justice Department and government officials who have dedicated many years of service to the criminal justice system and have a continuing interest in preserving the fair and effective administration of criminal trials.2 As such, amici understand the duty of prosecutors “to seek justice within the bounds of the law, not merely to convict.” ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Prosecution and Defense Function, Standard 3-1.2(c) (4th ed. 2015). Amici write to emphasize that fundamental to vindicating this responsibility is making timely disclosure of all material and favorable evidence to the defense.

As the Supreme Court recognized in Brady v. Maryland, the failure to disclose favorable evidence “violates due process … irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); see also United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974) (“The very integrity of the judicial system and public confidence in the system depend on full disclosure of all the facts, within the framework of the rules of evidence.”). While this affirmative duty is above and beyond the demands of the “pure adversary model,” United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675 n.6 (1985), it is grounded in an understanding of the prosecutor’s “‘special role … in the search for truth in criminal trial,’” Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 696 (2004). From their years of combined experience, amici appreciate the challenging judgment calls prosecutors face on a daily basis, but they also deeply believe that fundamental fairness and public confidence in our justice system relies on prosecutors taking their disclosure obligations seriously and fulfilling this duty capaciously.

So begins the amicus pleading in support of the petitioner in Georgiou v. United States.

Under the “old” Article 32, the right to call and examine witnesses and to obtain production (discovery) of evidence was pretty robust.

All Services except the Air Force and Coast Guard routinely recorded the audio of the hearing.  That audio could then be transcribed into a verbatim transcript.  The benefit to the government was that in the event a witness became unavailable at trial, there existed a “deposition,” or at least something akin to a deposition which could be used in evidence at trial in the extreme case.

The Article 32 testimony as substitute for the actual appearance of the witness is guided by United States v. Norris, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 574, 37 C.M.R. 194 (to be admissible, must be verbatim); United States v. Burrow, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 94, 36 C.M.R. 250; Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965)(testimony might be received only if “taken at a full-fledged hearing at which petitioner had been represented by counsel who had been given a complete and adequate opportunity to cross-examine.” Id., at page 407.

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