Over the transom comes the petition in Perez v. Colorado at the Supreme Court.
Whether, and to what extent, the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee a criminal defendant the right to discover potentially exculpatory mental health records held by a private party, notwithstanding a state privilege law to the contrary.
The petition begins with,
Military prisoners may go on MSRP at their MRD unless going into parole. There are many conditions and some consequences for failure to follow the rules. With that in mind, we may need to pay attention and give some thought to:
United States v. Haymond, decided today (26 June 2019) by the Supremes. The opinion is written by Gorsuch. (I’ve linked to SCOTUSBlog so you can the briefs and the opinion.
Some early comment from Prof. Doug Berman — here.
My first GCM involved eyewitness identification and a motion to suppress based on an improperly suggestive show-up when the client was arrested. He was handcuffed in the back of the police car and the armed robbery victim was brought to the police car and asked ”is that him” or words to that effect. Since then I’ve not had a case where there was a serious question of identification. That said, Prof. Miller, one of my favorite evidence bloggers has this piece.
He first notes that misidentification contributed to 75% of exoneration cases. Then he moves to Mil. R. Evid. 801 and how an out of court identification may not he hearsay.
Let’s take a look at United States v. Criswell, a case decided by the Army adverse to the appellant, and now pending review at CAAF, on the following issue.
No. 18-0091/AR. U.S. v. Andrew J. Criswell. CCA 20150530. On consideration of the petition for grant of review of the decision of the United States Army Court of Criminal Appeals, it is ordered that said petition is hereby granted on the following issue:
WHETHER THE MILITARY JUDGE ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN DENYING A DEFENSE MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE ACCUSING WITNESS’S IN-COURT IDENTIFICATION OF APPELLANT.
There is an excellent post at Volokh Conspiracy.
Here’s the problem in a nutshell: So much at trial can turn on the testimony of a police officer. For a criminal defendant, life and liberty may depend on the ability to impeach the officer’s testimony. The federal constitution, as interpreted by Brady v. Maryland and its progeny, requires prosecutors to disclose to defendants any favorable, material evidence known to the prosecution team, including evidence relating to a witness’s credibility. Much impeachment evidence can be found in a police officer’s personnel file. But in many jurisdictions, a thicket of state laws, local policies, and bare-knuckle political pressure prevents access to the material in these personnel files, despite the federal constitutional requirement to disclose. In the name of protecting police privacy, criminal defendants are denied their due process rights to a fair trial.
Here’s what I ask for in my discovery requests.
Are you at a base overseas?
Do you have foreign national witnesses or foreign language documents as evidence in your case?
United States v. Aifang Ye, No. 12-10576 (9th Cir. 2015)
Under the “old” Article 32, the right to call and examine witnesses and to obtain production (discovery) of evidence was pretty robust.
All Services except the Air Force and Coast Guard routinely recorded the audio of the hearing. That audio could then be transcribed into a verbatim transcript. The benefit to the government was that in the event a witness became unavailable at trial, there existed a “deposition,” or at least something akin to a deposition which could be used in evidence at trial in the extreme case.
The Article 32 testimony as substitute for the actual appearance of the witness is guided by United States v. Norris, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 574, 37 C.M.R. 194 (to be admissible, must be verbatim); United States v. Burrow, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 94, 36 C.M.R. 250; Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965)(testimony might be received only if “taken at a full-fledged hearing at which petitioner had been represented by counsel who had been given a complete and adequate opportunity to cross-examine.” Id., at page 407.
Court-Martial Trial Practice Blog