Court-Martial Trial Practice Blog
The Case in Brief
The Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals decided United States v. Sanchez, No. 202500114, on May 28, 2026. A military judge at a general court-martial at MCAS Miramar convicted a 19-year-old Marine, in accordance with his pleas negotiated with the Office of Special Trial Counsel, of two specifications of sexual abuse of a child by indecent communication under Article 120b, UCMJ, and of production and possession of child pornography under Article 134. The plea agreement set total confinement between 60 and 180 months; the judge adjudged segmented, concurrent terms totaling 144 months, plus reduction to E-1, total forfeitures, and a dishonorable discharge. The sole assignment of error asked whether 144 months was “plainly unreasonable.” NMCCA affirmed — and in doing so, gave the new standard its first real architecture.
The Issue That Matters: Defining the Standard Congress Never Defined
For offenses committed on or after December 28, 2023, military judges sentence alone within sentencing parameters, and Congress replaced the Courts of Criminal Appeals’ old sentence-appropriateness authority with review for whether a sentence “is plainly unreasonable” under Article 66(e)(1)(D). But no one defined the phrase. CAAF has not addressed it, and the 2024 Manual for Courts-Martial deleted the prior R.C.M. 1117(e) definition. Sanchez fills the gap.
The court traced the phrase to its source: the Military Justice Review Group lifted it from 18 U.S.C. § 3742, intending “substantial deference to the trial judge” in line with Booker and Gall. NMCCA then adopted the Fourth Circuit’s two-step framework from United States v. Crudup. Step one asks whether the sentence is “unreasonable” — irrational, capricious, lacking common sense or a rational legal basis. If the sentence survives that inquiry, the analysis ends. Only an unreasonable sentence proceeds to step two: whether it is “plainly” so, meaning clearly or obviously, borrowing from plain-error jurisprudence. Stack that two-step on top of parameter-compliant sentencing and bargained-for ranges, and appellate relief on sentence severity becomes vanishingly rare.
Two more holdings deserve attention. First, the court openly questioned whether the Lacy closely-related-case sentence comparison requirement survives the Article 66 amendments at all — and held that even assuming it does, listing eight cases that share one charge, with no facts, meets no burden. Second, the court invoked its Avellaneda principle: when a represented accused bargains for a sentence range, that bargain is strong evidence the sentence is not too severe. Sanchez received 36 months less than his agreed ceiling and 96 months below the parameter maximum.
Lessons for the Defense
Sanchez confirms that real sentencing advocacy now happens before and at trial, not on appeal. The plea negotiation with OSTC is where confinement gets decided — note that the agreement’s 60-month floor sat below the 120-month parameter minimum for production alone, a below-parameter term the military judge could have rejected under Article 53a but accepted. A military defense lawyer must master parameter categories, segmented sentencing, and concurrent-versus-consecutive structuring, because the appellate safety net Congress wove for the old system no longer catches within-parameter sentences. And appellate rights now turn on offense dates twice over: January 1, 2021 divides the factual sufficiency regimes, and December 28, 2023 divides the sentencing regimes. Counsel — including Article 120 defense lawyers handling child-offense cases where parameter categories run highest — must know which rules govern before advising on any plea. Our Article 120 penalties and sentencing guide explains the parameter system in detail.
Experience Matters
The military justice system rebuilt its sentencing rules from the ground up, and Sanchez shows the appellate courts constructing doctrine in real time. Military defense counsel who litigated under both regimes — and who track each new decision interpreting the UCMJ’s amendments — hold a decisive advantage in plea negotiations and on appeal. If you face charges or sentencing under the new parameters, call Cave & Freeburg, LLP, at (703) 298-9562 or (917) 701-8961.