A friend brought to my attention this little item for our weekend reading.
NOTES: PROSECUTORIAL POWER AND THE LEGITIMACY OF THE MILITARY JUSTICE SYSTEM. 123 HARVARD L. REV. 937 (2010).
Is the concluding paragraph correct?
A friend brought to my attention this little item for our weekend reading.
NOTES: PROSECUTORIAL POWER AND THE LEGITIMACY OF THE MILITARY JUSTICE SYSTEM. 123 HARVARD L. REV. 937 (2010).
Is the concluding paragraph correct?
Since Denedo, and definitely since Padilla, military defense counsel must tell a client about the potential for deportation.
A former U.S. Marine from Jamaica who was convicted by special court-martial of having sex with a girl younger than 16 is eligible for deportation, the Third Circuit ruled.
Gurson Gourzong, a native of Jamaica, was admitted to the U.S. as a lawful permanent resident in 1983, and thereafter joined the U.S. Marine Corps.
The Department of Defense (DoD) is publishing this notice to announce that it is renewing the charter for the Judicial Proceedings Since Fiscal Year 2012 Amendments Panel (“the Panel”).
The National Post (Canada) reports:
The Canadian Forces has distributed 120,000 wallet-size cards to military personnel to remind them that sexual assault is an “inappropriate” behaviour.
The cards are to be carried by military staff on the job, including when they are sent overseas.
I came across a couple of Air Force opinions and have posted about habeas corpus and coram nobis.
On 20 May 2016, the President, exercising his powers under UCMJ art. 36, signed an executive order amending the Manual for Courts-Martial. Changes to the rules of evidence are included. It was a change to Rule 311 that has draw significant attention and discussion among the UCMJ literati. Basically, a military judge grants suppression when
“exclusion of the evidence results in appreciable deterrence of future unlawful searches or seizures and the benefits of such deterrence outweigh the costs to the justice system.”
Mil. R. Evid. 311(a)(3) (2016).
Yes, is my answer, or at least that is my answer in a brief filed with the Army Court of Criminal Appeals and in several arguments at court-martial.
Under Mil. R. Evid. 801(2), you can offer the out of court statements of an opposing party or certain statements of that parties lawyer as evidence. Such evidence is not hearsay.
(d) Statements that Are Not Hearsay.
Yes, is my answer.
In several cases at trial I have objected to prosecution evidence under Mil. R. Evid. 412, for the prosecution’s failure to follow the rule.
Mil. R. Evid. 412 is clear that it applies to prosecutors. First the rule states:
Worth the read is a pending Supreme Court petition that may have impact on military cases.
Issue: Whether the Confrontation Clause permits the prosecution to introduce an out-of-court, testimonial translation, without making the translator available for confrontation and cross-examination.
That is the issue in Ye v. United States, a history of which can be found at SCOTUSBlog.
OPNAV INSTRUCTION 1750.3A
From: Chief of Naval Operations Subj: TRANSITIONAL COMPENSATION FOR ABUSED DEPENDENTS