Here are a couple of CAAF grants of immediate interest to trial practitioners.

No. 08-0808/AR.  U.S. v. Derand M. DAVIS.  CCA 20070808 (couldn't see this on the Army public website).  Review granted on the following issue:

WHETHER TRIAL DEFENSE COUNSEL PROVIDED, TO THE SUBSTANTIAL PREJUDICE OF APPELLANT, INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN THE POST-TRIAL PHASE WHEN HE, WITHOUT CONSULTING WITH APPELLANT, SUBMITTED MATTERS TO THE CONVENING AUTHORITY BUT FAILED TO SUBMIT APPELLANT'S PERSONAL STATEMENT.

Here is a post from Prof. Colin Miller reminding us that hearsay within hearsay is still a potential objection to the contents of business records sought to be admitted under a Mil. R. Evid. 803 exception.

Prof. Colin Miller, Layering Effect: Ninth Circuit Finds Public Record With Hearsay Within Hearsay Was Improperly Admitted, EvidenceProf blog, 28 March 2009.

The recent opinion of the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Marguet-Pilado,  08- 50130 (9th Cir. March 27, 2009), addresses a topic that I just covered in my Evidence class yesterday:  If a business or public record contains statements made by someone outside the business or public agency, you have hearsay within hearsay, and each level of hearsay must be admissible under some applicable exception.

Here's a filler piece from Slate.
Nina S. Rastogi, Murder, She Wrote: How forensic handwriting identification works, Slate, 26 March 2009.
Here's an interesting standard for expert testimony admissibility:

According to the handful of studies on the subject, a trained examiner will be correct more often than a layman.

One 1997 study

A lot of times we get caught up in the need for an "expert" witness.  If you have an expert witness the person is testifying under Mil. R. Evid. 702.  True, the expert can "get-in" more information than other witnesses, but do you always need an expert.  Federal Evidence blog reminds us that lay witnesses can often be sufficient testifying under Mil. R. Evid. 701.  This is an excellent blog for all kinds of evidentiary issues and background information.  Here is their note about one such recent case.

The First Circuit explains the circumstances in which an undercover agent may give lay testimony “as to the meaning of code words or phrases” concerning drug quantities based on the agent's “undercover drug buys”; noting as one factor whether the witness's lay testimony “corresponds” to undisputed facts, in United States v. Santiago, __ F.3d __ (1st Cir. March 19, 2009) (Nos. 07-1575, 07-1718, 07-1728, 07-2017).

Are you like me — you need to send or receive large files via email.  If that's the case — the law enforcement ROI, is a good example — here is a free, experimental way to transfer large files without having to send them by email.  Most email accounts have size limits on what can be sent as an attachment to an email.  I don't know yet if it works to a military computer.

JetBytes

 tip: Future Lawyer

Is there about to be another shift in interrogations law from the Supreme Court.  Earlier we mentioned several commentators on the subject of how the "new" court is changing personal rights when faced with investigators.  See an earlier post: Exclusionary Rule — To be Dead Letter Law — Possibly?

Court questions Michigan v. Jackson from SCOTUSBlog.

The Supreme Court on Friday told lawyers in a pending case, heard on

United States v. Forney, __ M.J. ___ (C.A.A.F. March 26, 2009).  This is a case where the appellant was convicted on charges and evidence for a situation later declared unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court, in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002).  This is the issue of actual versus virtual CP — primarily the Japanese anime cartoon type.  However, the court found that the appellant could properly be convicted of conduct unbecoming in violation of Article 133, UCMJ.

[T]he possession of images of virtual children engaged in sexually explicit conduct may give rise to a conviction for conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman.

That the possession of virtual child pornography may be constitutionally protected speech in civilian society does not mean it is protected under military law.

United States v. Clayton, __ M.J. ___ (C.A.A.F. March 26, 2009).

In this case one police officer testified, and he was allowed to testify about his personal knowledge of drugs found.  However, the military judge also allowed the witness to lay a foundation for a redacted translation of a German police report of drugs found and their place of finding by other police officers and a civilian.  The other police officers and the civilian were not called as witnesses and they had apparently not testified at an Article 32, UCMJ, hearing or in a deposition.

Most pertinent to this case, the Supreme Court has identified “‘statements that were made under
circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial’” as an example of “core” testimonial hearsay.  Rankin, 64 M.J. at 351 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52). In turn, this Court has established “a number of questions . . . relevant in distinguishing between testimonial and nontestimonial hearsay made under circumstances that would cause an objective witness to reasonably believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial.” Id. at 352.
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