Welcome to the real world.
Earl Kelly, Academy Justice Tilted Toward Women: Double Standard in Mid Sex Cases During Rempt Era, The (Annapolis) Capital, 17 May 2009.
This issue is not limited to the Naval Academy. This is a natural all too predictable outcome of the pendulum shift.
Here is a good case offered by Prof. Colin Miller, Under Construction: Ninth Circuit Resolves Interplay Between Rules Of Evidence 608 And 609, 17 May 2009.
As the 9th and Professor Miller note this was a close issue.
And here is another treatment of the case at FederalEvidence.blog,“Collateral Details” Of The Defendant’s Prior Conviction Results In Reversal.
Here is the Federal Register for CAAF rule changes.
Wisconsin (five days before Weaver) finds GPS tracking reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, but it is troubled by it and urges the legislature to limit it. State v. Sveum, 2009 Wisc. App. LEXIS 343 (May 7, 2009).
The New York Court of Appeals decided Weaver v. People, No. 53 (May 12, 2009), holding that the NY Constitution prohibits the use of GPS transmitters on vehicles without a warrant, following other state courts analyzing the issue under their constitutions.
Here’s a new law review article to go along with my rants about how prosecution expert and forensic evidence can be biased, it’s difficult to deal with, and the system allows the problem.
Volume 95, Issue 1
Brandon L. Garrett and Peter J. Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science Testimony and Wrongful Convictions, 95 Va. L. Rev. 1 (2009) View PDF
This is the first study to explore the forensic science testimony by prosecution experts in the trials of innocent persons, all convicted of serious crimes, who were later exonerated by post-conviction DNA testing. Trial transcripts were sought for all 156 exonerees identified as having trial testimony by forensic analysts, of which 137 were located and reviewed. These trials most commonly included serological analysis and microscopic hair comparison, but some included bite mark, shoe print, soil, fiber, and fingerprint comparisons, and several included DNA testing. This study found that in the bulk of these trials of innocent defendants—82 cases or 60 percent—forensic analysts called by the prosecution provided invalid testimony at trial—that is, testimony with conclusions misstating empirical data or wholly unsupported by empirical data. This was not the testimony of a mere handful of analysts: this set of trials included invalid testimony by seventy-two forensic analysts called by the prosecution and employed by fifty-two laboratories, practices, or hospitals from twenty-five states. Unfortunately, the adversary system largely failed to police this invalid testimony. Defense counsel rarely cross-examined analysts concerning invalid testimony and rarely obtained experts of their own. In the few cases in which invalid forensic science was challenged, judges seldom provided relief.
The University of Pennsylvania PENNumbra has an interesting dialogue about plea bargaining, the unlimited unregulated powers of prosecutors, and those who might be innocent, but plead guilty anyway.
There are three points of view. Of the most interesting seems to be that innocent accused’s may plea guilty to avoid a wrongful conviction and increased sentence risk; and that’s a good thing for society and the innocent accused.
We talk a lot about appellate issues and whether they should be raised. Of course in the military we have United States v. Grostefon. There is also talk about changing the post-trial process and possibly placing more responsibility on the trial defense counsel to initially raise appellate issues (a broadening of Palenius). So here is an interesting little case on how a federal district court resolves appellate issues under Anders.
After a jury trial, Jeffery Carter was convicted of distributing crack, see 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and the district court sentenced him to 180 months in prison. Carter filed a notice of appeal, but his appointed counsel now seeks to withdraw under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), because he cannot discern a nonfrivolous basis for appeal. Because counsel’s supporting brief is adequate, we limit our review to the potential issues identified in counsel’s brief and Carter’s Circuit Rule 51(b) response to his lawyer’s motion to withdraw. See United States v. Schuh, 289 F.3d 968, 973-74 (7th Cir. 2002).
United States v. Carter, No.08-1419, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 9939, at *1 (7th Cir. 2009).
Andrew Taslitz has a comment on Concurring Opinions today: Government Lawyers’ Ethical Obligations and the War on Terror. This piece could apply equally to trial counsel and staff judge advocates, as well as defense counsel. The comment is about the current call(s) for action against the Bush administration lawyers and torture memos.
These stories stress the importance of government lawyers’ advisory role and start from the assumption that there is a sort of “truth” about what the law is on a particular matter. That need not mean that there is only one “right” answer, but it does mean that some answers are outside the realm of the plausible; that even within the plausible, the case for some answers is far weaker than for others; and that there are widely understood standards for what is “good lawyering,” including adequate research, factual investigation, consideration of opposing arguments, and sensitivity to the practical effects of government policy.
The articles also assume that government lawyers as advisors have an obligation to tell their client things he or she might not care to know, to act as the government’s conscience, and to be attentive to history and constitutional values as much as case law precedent.
Court-Martial Trial Practice Blog
