Professor Friedman has a quick note on a petition filed at the Supremes in Racz v. California.

The petition ably shows that there is a sharp conflict of authority on the question of whether a statement can be deemed testimonial even though it was not made to governmental authorities. Regular readers of this blog will know that I believe the answer to that question should be affirmative. This is an important issue that the Supreme Court should resolve soon; whether this case is a good vehicle for that purpose, I do not know.  (Emphasis added.)

People v. Racz, No. BA320288, August 30, 2010 (Ca.. App. 2010)(unpub.).  It appears a petition for review at the California Supreme Court was denied on 15 December 2010.

The fayobserver.com reports:  The top enlisted Special Forces soldier has been removed from his position while commanders investigate allegations that he had an extramarital relationship.  In addition to the adultery, the military investigation:

The military investigation, Pruitt asserts in the court documents, is focused on determining whether Vigil broke a military law that prohibits unbecoming conduct and whether he shared classified information with her.

In doing some browsing I came across a copy of the Article 32, UCMJ, IO report in United States v. Wuterich at this link.  There’s also a link to various reports on the Haditha “cases.”

You are aware of Fasler and the numerous trailer cases.  Here is a grant from today’s CAAF orders:

No. 11-0374/AR.  U.S. v. Lelan M. SHANKLES.  CCA 20100307.  Review granted on the following specified issue:

WHETHER AN ARTICLE 134 CLAUSE 1 OR 2 SPECIFICATION THAT FAILS TO EXPRESSLY ALLEGE EITHER POTENTIAL TERMINAL ELEMENT STATES AN OFFENSE UNDER THE SUPREME COURT’S HOLDINGS IN UNITED STATES v. RESENDIZ-PONCE AND RUSSELL v. UNITED STATES, AND THIS COURT’S RECENT OPINIONS IN MEDINA, MILLER AND JONES.

Professor Colin Miller has a very interesting post regarding a new article by Cynthia Jones, A Reason to Doubt: The Suppression of Evidence and the Inference of Innocence, 100 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 415 (2010).

Most importantly are two potential recommendations for dealing with the issue at trial.  First Professor Jones takes up the two common actions:   dismissal or continuance.  She explains why, as we know, dismissal is an unlikely drastic remedy, and why a continuance may be meaningless.  She doesn’t directly address one of the remedies I’ve asked for: prohibit the witness testimony.

She raises two very interesting remedies:  a “Brady Instruction,” partly based on Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 37(c), and an instruction on “Consciousness of a Weak Case Inference.”

Houston Chronicle reports:   An Army witness who says he stumbled onto a fellow soldier killing a U.S. superior at their patrol base in Iraq testified Monday he thought he was running toward nighttime enemy fire as he responded to gunshots — until he heard the shooter shout “I’ll kill you” in English and saw his face illuminated by his flashing rifle.  Sgt. Joseph Bozicevich, 41, of Minneapolis, faces a possible death sentence[.]

Florida Wires reports that:  An Army judge has ordered a recess in the court-martial of a Fort Stewart sergeant charged with murder in the 2008 slayings of a superior and a fellow U.S. soldier in Iraq.  Prosecutors rested their case against 41-year-old Sgt. Joseph Bozicevich (BOZ-eh-vich) of Minneapolis on Tuesday after two weeks of testimony. The judge has instructed Bozicevich’s attorneys to open their defense next Tuesday.  The decision to take a break in the case was prompted by Fort Stewart’s training calendar. Troops at the Georgia Army post have a four-day weekend coming up, with days off Friday and Monday, to give them extra leave around Mother’s Day.  [No doubt the defense will get a short weekend.]

Contact Information