Court-Martial Trial Practice Blog
I refer from time to time to court-martial decisions from other countries. Obviously, they are not dispositive here, but there can be some interesting arguments or points come from them, which is why I bring you R v. Jordan, a decision of the Supreme Court of Canada addressing court-martial speedy trial issues.
In Jordan the appellant sought dismissal of his case for a denial of speedy trial. In summary, the court argued,
Per Abella, Moldaver, Karakatsanis, Côté and Brown JJ.: The delay was unreasonable and J’s s. 11(b) Charter right was infringed. The Morin framework for applying s. 11(b) has given rise to both doctrinal and practical problems, contributing to a culture of delay and complacency towards it. Doctrinally, the Morin framework is too unpredictable, too confusing, and too complex. It has itself become a burden on already over‑burdened trial courts. From a practical perspective, the Morin framework’s after‑the‑fact rationalization of delay does not encourage participants in the justice system to take preventative measures to address inefficient practices and resourcing problems.
A new framework is therefore required to focus on the necessary analysis and to “encourage all participants in the criminal justice system to cooperate in achieving reasonably prompt justice[.]”
“At the heart of this new framework is a presumptive ceiling beyond which delay — from the charge to the actual or anticipated end of trial — is presumed to be unreasonable, unless exceptional circumstances justify it. The presumptive ceiling is 18 months for cases tried in the provincial court, and 30 months for cases in the superior court (or cases tried in the provincial court after a preliminary inquiry). Delay attributable to or waived by the defence does not count towards the presumptive ceiling.
Once the presumptive ceiling is exceeded, the burden is on the Crown to rebut the presumption of unreasonableness on the basis of exceptional circumstances. If the Crown cannot do so, a stay will follow. Exceptional circumstances lie outside the Crown’s control in that (1) they are reasonably unforeseen or reasonably unavoidable, and (2) they cannot reasonably be remedied.
It is obviously impossible to identify in advance all circumstances that may qualify as exceptional[.] Ultimately, the determination of whether circumstances are exceptional will depend on the trial judge’s good sense and experience. The list is not closed. However, in general, exceptional circumstances fall under two categories: discrete events and particularly complex cases.
If the exceptional circumstance relates to a discrete event (such as an illness or unexpected event at trial), the delay reasonably attributable to that event is subtracted from the total delay. If the exceptional circumstance arises from the case’s complexity, the delay is reasonable and no further analysis is required.
An exceptional circumstance is the only basis upon which the Crown can discharge its burden to justify a delay that exceeds the ceiling. The seriousness or gravity of the offence cannot be relied on, nor can chronic institutional delay. Most significantly, the absence of prejudice can in no circumstances be used to justify delays after the presumptive ceiling is breached. Once so much time has elapsed, only circumstances that are genuinely outside the Crown’s control and ability to remedy may furnish a sufficient excuse for the prolonged delay.
Below the presumptive ceiling, however, the burden is on the defence to show that the delay is unreasonable. To do so, the defence must establish that (1) it took meaningful steps that demonstrate a sustained effort to expedite the proceedings, and (2) the case took markedly longer than it reasonably should have. Absent these two factors, the s. 11(b) application must fail. Stays beneath the presumptive ceiling should only be granted in clear cases.
As to the first factor, while the defence might not be able to resolve the Crown’s or the trial court’s challenges, it falls to the defence to show that it attempted to set the earliest possible hearing dates, was cooperative with and responsive to the Crown and the court, put the Crown on timely notice w hen delay was becoming a problem, and conducted all applicationsreasonably and expeditiously. At the same time, trial judges should not take this opportunity, with the benefit of hindsight, to question every decision made by the defence. The defence is required to act reasonably, not perfectly.
Turning to the second factor, the defence must show that the time the case has taken markedly exceeds the reasonable time requirements of the case. These requirements derive from a variety of factors, including the complexity of the case and local considerations. Determining the time the case reasonably should have taken is not a matter of precise calculation, as has been the practice under the Morin framework.