Articles Posted in Uncategorized

In Ford v. Perry, the court set aside a conviction based on improper comments of the prosecutor during closing argument.

During closing arguments, Ford’s lawyer offered a classic criminal defense that contradictions of witnesses and doubt over the identity of the shooter meant that the presumption of innocence had not been satisfied.  The prosecutor then decided to dispense with the whole presumption:

“This idea of this presumption of innocence is over. Mr. Ford had a fair trial. We were here for three weeks where . . . he gets to cross-examine witnesses; also an opportunity to present evidence information through his lawyer. He had a fair trial. This system is not perfect, but he had a fair opportunity and a fair trial. He’s not presumed innocent anymore.”

Nathaniel Penn gives us a piece of  investigative journalism in his new article on Army 1st LT Clint Lorance. This is the sordid saga of a LT whose actions wreaked havoc on those within his platoon, whom a panel (jury) of Army Soldiers convicted of murder, and whom President Trump later pardoned after Fox News transformed Lorance into a weapon in the polarizing culture wars it has helped fuel.

The Joint Service Committee on Military Justice has submitted its subcommittee’s Prosecutorial Authority Study report in response to § 540F of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020. The report, which cost the taxpayers $109,000 (that’s $1185 per page, if you don’t count the appendices), can be found here. There’s also a one-page summary here.

Just Security discusses minimization of civilian casualties beyond that required by military necessity.

Against this backdrop, an important symposium series, “Civilian Casualties: The Law of Prevention and Response,” is kicking off on Wednesday (September 30) at noon EDT. The series is intended to promote deeper discussion and greater understanding of the broad range of considerations that underlie these critical issues. Conceived originally (before the pandemic) as a one-day event in Washington — part of the Signature Topic Initiative on Atrocity Prevention, sponsored by the American Society of International Law (ASIL) — the revamped online symposium format will facilitate a far wider range of participants as the Symposium takes a hard, honest look at these issues.

There will be six expert panels spread over a six-week period, each discussing a distinct area of law and policy on civilian casualties, each drawing from leaders and emerging voices from the military and government, civil society and humanitarian organizations, and academia. The U.S. Army Judge Advocate General, Lt. Gen. Charles Pede, will provide introductory keynote remarks on Wednesday. That will set the stage for the first week’s panel: “Compliance Professionals, The Law, and Ethics: Advising Leaders and Influencing Operations from the Front Lines.

NNY360 says,

The Fort Drum soldier charged with carrying a “ghost gun” at a Black Lives Matter protest in June in Troy has left the Army.

A Fort Drum official confirmed Noah Latham, 22, is no longer in the Army, as of Aug. 31. Mr. Latham was “separated administratively” from the Army, the official said.

We do that–right. Make an issue of the MCIO failures to investigate, their tunnel vision, their confirmation bias, and overall bias.

Here’s an Article that might help.

Lisa Steele, Investigating and Presenting an Investigative Omission Defense. 57 CRIM. L. BULL. (2021) (Forthcoming).

NMCCA published new rules effective 1 July 2020. Not this change. I’m agnostic whether this change will add confusion or not for the litigants.

Rule 17.5. Table of Pseudonyms. 

(a) With the exception of merits briefs, all initial briefs in support of an appeal or petition shall include a separate table of pseudonyms filed with the Court under seal. See Appendix K. Notwithstanding the fact that the table is filed under seal, the party filing the table will serve an unredacted copy of the table upon all other parties to the appellate litigation. Absent Order of the Court, all parties and the Court shall use the aassigned pseudonymsin all filings, orders, and opinions.

A colleague provided this thought.

“just got a call from a former Army member, who in 2005, decided that he didn’t want a second tour in Iraq, went AWOL for @ 2 months; turned himself in, but had hot pee for both THC and cocaine and for good measure, called a 2LT MP who ordered him confined based on the Desertion warrant, a “Butterbar a$$hole!” He got 14 months, E-1 and a BCD, on a naked plea. CA knocked 30 days off the sentence for some reason and he did around 8 months. Straightened himself out, operates heavy construction equipment and subject to random drug testing per conditions of employment – never flunked one.
But it seems last night, he went to buy a new shotgun for the upcoming deer hunting season, only to flunk the instant background check, and today, got paid a visit by an ATF agent and Deputy Sheriff, who confiscated his 3 rifles, and a double-barrel 12 gauge. Needless to say, not a happy camper.

I refer from time to time to court-martial decisions from other countries. Obviously, they are not dispositive here, but there can be some interesting arguments or points come from them, which is why I bring you R v. Jordan, a decision of the Supreme Court of Canada addressing court-martial speedy trial issues.

In Jordan the appellant sought dismissal of his case for a denial of speedy trial. In summary, the court argued,

Per Abella, Moldaver, Karakatsanis, Côté and Brown JJ.: The delay was unreasonable and J’s s. 11(bCharter right was infringed. The Morin framework for applying s. 11(b) has given rise to both doctrinal and practical problems, contributing to a culture of delay and complacency towards it. Doctrinally, the Morin framework is too unpredictable, too confusing, and too complex. It has itself become a burden on already over‑burdened trial courts. From a practical perspective, the Morin framework’s after‑the‑fact rationalization of delay does not encourage participants in the justice system to take preventative measures to address inefficient practices and resourcing problems.

Prof. Cole at CrimProfBlog brings us,

Nathan Lilly (Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law at Arizona State University) has posted The ‘High Skies’: Establishing Venue for Prosecutions of Crimes Aboard Aircraft (57 Crim L. Bull., no. 1, Forthcoming) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
A fundamental concept in criminal procedure is that the trial must take place where the crime was committed. Without proper venue, a defendant cannot be found guilty of the charged crime. But where is venue when the crime is committed on an airplane traveling through the sky at 500 miles per hour? This article analyzes United States v. Lozoya, a 2019 decision from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals that broke from the conventional wisdom of the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits in holding that the proper venue is the federal judicial district over which the plane was flying at the time of the crime. No legal scholarship has ever considered criminal venue in this particular context. This article analyzes the two main federal venue statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3237 and 3238, and argues that neither the Ninth Circuit approach nor the Tenth or Eleventh Circuit approaches view the law correctly. The most logical outcome — prosecution in the district in which the plane ultimately lands — is undisputed. But the plain meaning of the venue statutes supports the assumption that airplanes in the “high skies” are a lot like ships on the high seas. When the Ninth Circuit reconsiders this issue en banc in 2020, it can solve the problem by holding, for purposes of criminal venue, that American airspace is considered “outside of any district” and thus the prosecution can bring charges where the defendant is arrested (i.e. the landing district).
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