I always tell clients that the specific sex offender registration requirements are complicated and depend on state law. Here’s a reason why.
In New York a defendant can be forced to register as a sex offender for the rest of his life based on accusations a jury rejected. So the state’s highest court ruled last week in a case that illustrates how fear and loathing of sex offenders lead to results that would be recognized as unjust and illogical in any other context.
See more at reason.com
I have argued for some time that sex offender registration is punitive not merely collateral to a conviction.
This morning, the US Supreme Court granted cert in Gundy v. US to consider whether Congress’s delegation to the attorney general the power to issue regulations interpreting the federal Sex Offender Notification and Registration Act violates the nondelegation doctrine. That grant on that issue right has Con Law fans buzzing. But sentencing fans more interested in the substance of sex offender registries will want to check out this new commentary by Jesse Kelley in The Hill under the headline “The Sex Offender Registry: Vengeful, unconstitutional and due for full repeal.”
So begins a post by Professor Berman of Sentencing Law & Policy blog.
Since United States v. Hills, and then United States v. Hukill, the appellate courts have been trying to sort out quite a few cases on remand. Here is a list of the most recent CAAF actions.
No. 18-0087/AF. U.S. v. Jonathan P. Robertson. CCA 39061. On consideration of the petition for grant of review of the decision of the United States Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals, and in light of United States v. Guardado, 77 M.J. 90 (C.A.A.F.2017), it is ordered that said petition is hereby granted on the following issue:
WHETHER THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL PROPENSITY INSTRUCTION IN THIS CASE WAS HARMLESS BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT.
In United States v. Sager, the accused was convicted of abusive sexual contact because the victim was “otherwise unaware” of the acts. The Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the findings and sentence. Appellant petitioned the CAAF.
This case is before us for a second time. The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) reversed our earlier opinion affirming the appellant’s conviction for abusive sexual contact.2 At the heart of the appellate litigation in this case is a question over the interpretation of Article 120(b)(2), UCMJ, which proscribes sexual contact with people the accused knows, or reasonably should know, are incapable of consenting to the contact because they are “asleep, unconscious, or otherwise unaware” that the contact is occurring. The unusual posture of this case after trial required us to decide whether the terms asleep, unconscious, and otherwise unaware represented distinct theories of criminal liability. In our first review of this case, we held that they do not. Rather, we held that the reasons for a victim’s lack of awareness, be it sleep, unconsciousness, or something else, were only relevant to whether the accused should have known that the victim was unaware of the contact.
The CAAF held that our interpretation was incorrect. Reversing this court, the CAAF held that “asleep, unconscious, or otherwise unaware” represents three separate theories of liability. The CAAF also held that the term otherwise unaware means unaware in a manner different from both sleep and unconsciousness.
Lagano, Edmundson, and Grant, The Air Force SVC Program, The First Five Years. 44 (3) The Reporter 31 (2017).
Welch, Child Pornography, The Internet, and MRE 414. 44(2) The Reporter 19 (2017).
The Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals (AFCCA) has issued an interesting en banc (5-3) opinion in United States v. Hamilton, 76 M.J. ___ (A. F. Ct. Crim. App. 2017), about victim impact evidence or statements.
The accused pleaded guilty to the possession and distribution of child pornography. On sentencing, as we often see in these cases, the prosecution introduced unsworn statements of the victims, all of which predated the accused’s date of offenses. For those who haven’t been exposed to these statements, generally, they review the abuse that occurred at the time the video or image was taken and the subsequent life and health effects on the victim. We know that courts allow such information because of the idea that a victim is re-victimized each time a person views or distributes the images–it’s essentially an ongoing crime. Slip op. at 7-8.
I think there are several takeaways for practitioners.
I’ve been told more than once that a person doesn’t make a false allegation of rape because they have been rejected by someone they are romantically interested in. Such denials a batguano crazy. Take this as an example.
Following the verdict, Joanne Jakymec, chief Crown prosecutor for Wessex said: “Rebecca Palmer indulged in consensual sexual activity with the victim, but on being rejected by him embarked on a malicious campaign which led to him being arrested on more than one occasion and held in custody for periods of time.
From the Swindon Advertiser.
United States v. Campbell, decided by the Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals (9/17), presents a current look at United States v. Terlap and proper sentencing evidence. The Appellant “that the military judge admitted improper evidence in aggravation and testimony contradictory to the stipulation of fact.”
During presentencing testimony, the military judge asked BI, “You never moved away or pushed away from the hand; it stopped voluntarily?” (R. at 129.) She answered, “I did push his hand away.” (Id.) During closing argument, defense counsel requested that the military judge not consider that testimony, as it conflicted with the stipulation of fact.
The CGCCA decided that the information did not contradict the stipulation of fact and was, likely, more of the facts and circumstances surrounding the offense to which the appellant pleaded guilty.
As I have argued, for some time in courts-martial, sex offender registration is effectively a punishment in today’s society–despite what legislators and courts say. Well, now we have an interesting decision from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in a 3-1 decision, about ex post facto changes to SOR.
[T]he provisions of the state’s sex offender registration law (SORNA) [are] unconstitutional under the state and federal constitutions, according to the majority in Commonwealth v. Muniz held that 1) SORNA’s registration provisions constitute punishment notwithstanding the General Assembly’s identification of the provisions as nonpunitive; 2) retroactive application of SORNA’s registration provisions violates the federal ex post facto clause; and 3) retroactive application of SORNA’s registration provisions also violates the ex post facto clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
The bottom line here for me is that various courts are now holding that SOR is punitive. I argue that as the reason an accused should be able to raise SOR requirements in sentencing and that the members should not be given a “Talkington” instruction.
Court-Martial Trial Practice Blog