United States v. Guzman

1. Charges and Sentence

Charges/Specifications:

The appellant, Chief Hospital Corpsman (E-7) Marvin B. Guzman, U.S. Navy, was tried by general court-martial at Naval Base San Diego, California, and convicted by members with enlisted representation of:

  • One specification of violation of a lawful general order, in violation of Article 92, UCMJ (wrongful personal/sexual relationship with an applicant).

  • One specification of abuse of position as a military recruiter, in violation of Article 93a, UCMJ.

  • One specification of obstructing justice, in violation of Article 131b, UCMJ (wrongfully intimidating an applicant by threatening to cause loss of her professional license to obstruct an investigation).

Sentence: After the findings, the military judge conditionally dismissed the Article 92 charge due to an unreasonable multiplication of charges and adjudged no punishment.


2. Issue Presented

Appellant raised four assignments of error on appeal:

  1. Factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting the obstruction of justice conviction (i.e., whether there was intent to obstruct an ongoing investigation).

  2. Legal sufficiency of that conviction due to Government argument and military judge instructions on uncharged theories of liability.

  3. Whether defense forfeited objection to the military judge’s instruction on the intent element of obstruction of justice, and if so whether the judge’s failure to give the proper instruction was plain error.

  4. If waiver occurred, whether trial defense counsel’s failure to request the correct instruction constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.


3. Analysis of the Opinion

A. Factual Sufficiency

The NMCCA applied a fresh, impartial review of evidence to independently determine whether proof beyond a reasonable doubt supported the conviction. The court determined:

  • Appellant sent a threatening text message on 1 August 2021 to Ms. Hotel, urging her not to meet with the investigating officer and threatening to report her employer/licensure.

  • Appellant was aware an investigation was underway.

  • Circumstantial evidence (multiple texts, direct communications) supported the conclusion that his intent was to obstruct the due administration of justice, not merely to end harassment.

Conclusion: The obstruction conviction was factually sufficient.

B. Legal Sufficiency

Legal sufficiency is assessed under the Jackson v. Virginia standard. The NMCCA held:

  • The Government charged obstruction with intent to “obstruct” and argued that intent at trial.

  • Reliance on terms like “influence” or “impede” in the instruction did not change the charging theory or prejudice the appellant.

  • Citing United States v. Mendoza, the court explained that conflating inconsistent theories can raise due process issues, but here the government did not shift theories; it proved intent to obstruct as charged.

  • The court rejected reliance on United States v. Sager (about inconsistent elements within a disjunctive clause) because the context and statutory construction differ materially.

Conclusion: Appellant’s conviction for obstructing justice was legally sufficient.

C. Waiver/Forfeiture of Instruction Objection

Under United States v. Davis, R.C.M. 920(f) requires timely objection to instructions. The appellant’s counsel expressly declined to object and requested no additional instructions, which the court found constituted waiver (not just forfeiture). Objection to the instruction could not be reviewed absent plain error.

Conclusion: Appellant waived any objection to the intent element instruction.

D. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim

Applying the Strickland two-prong test (deficiency + prejudice), the court found:

  • Even if failure to object was arguably deficient, there was no reasonable probability that exclusion of “influence/impede” from the instruction would have changed the outcome, given the strength of evidence and appellant’s theory focusing on intent.

Conclusion: Defense counsel was not ineffective.


4. Primary Law Used

Authority Application
UCMJ Articles 92, 93a, 131b Charged offenses; obstruction requires intent to “influence, impede, or otherwise obstruct” the due administration of justice.
Article 66, UCMJ Standard for factual sufficiency review.
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979); Turner Standard for legal sufficiency.
United States v. Mendoza Due process in charging vs. proof theories.
United States v. Davis Waiver of instructional error claims.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) Ineffective assistance framework.

Conclusion

In United States v. Guzman, the NMCCA upheld the obstructing justice conviction against factual and legal sufficiency, waiver, and ineffective assistance claims, affirming findings and sentence.

At Cave & Freeburg, we routinely litigate and brief complex UCMJ issues involving intent, sufficiency standards, instructional error, and appellate waiver doctrines before courts-martial and military appellate courts. Our experience ensures robust defense strategies at trial and meticulous preservation of issues for appeal.

Contact Information