“of late, an important shift has occurred in the views of state and lower federal courts, which have increasingly found fault with “new-generation” SORN laws, which in many respects are more expansive and onerous than those condoned by the” Supreme Court in Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003) (cleaned up?).
In the federal judicial realm, the Sixth Court of Appeals in Does v. Snyder unanimously invalidated on federal ex post facto grounds Michigan’s law that, like many other amended state laws, not only requires in-person information verification and updating by registrants, but also limits where they can live and work. To the Sixth Circuit, Michigan’s SORN law was “something altogether different from and more troubling than Alaska’s circa 2000 first-generation registry law.” Tellingly, when the State petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for certiorari, and the Court invited the Acting U.S. Solicitor General to weigh in and brief the matter, the latter acknowledged the correctness of the decision in light of what it termed the “distinctive features” of Michigan’s law. Whether it is accurate to say that the Michigan law varies so substantially as to make it sui generis is certainly subject to dispute,19 but the reluctance of the Court and the Solicitor General (in the Trump administration, no less) to let stand a circuit decision categorically invalidating a state SORN law, using quite denunciatory language,20 was a significant surprise.
From, Logan, Wayne A., Challenging the Punitiveness of ‘New-Generation’ SORN Laws (May 18, 2018). 21 New Criminal Law Review (2018 Forthcoming). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3180899
I regularly submit a trial motion that United States v. Talkington, 73 M.J. 212 (C.A.A.F. 2014), was wrongly decided or no longer valid. In connection with the motion, I argue several reasons why future sex offender registration is relevant to several military sentencing philosophies.