Do you ever get the client or family member who want to sue NCIS, OSI, CID, CGIS, for what they did in an interrogation.  Barring application of Feres (ha, some English major has to find something wrong with that).

Check out Smith v. Campbell, et. al., 295 Fed. Appx. 314, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 19085 (11th Cir. 2008), a case in which the police got Ms. Smith to confess to murder of a person who committed suicide.  The police interrogation methods did not shock the conscience and were justified.  Ms. Smith's 1983 case dismissed.

NACDL has an interesting News Release, Civil Liberties, Religious Groups Seek to Require Warrants for Police GPS Surveillance.

A diverse group of civil liberties and religious organizations this week weighed in on the question of whether police need a warrant in order to conduct surveillance of personal vehicles by secretly attaching global positioning satellite (GPS) transmitters. The case, which is scheduled to be heard next month in New York’s highest court, has profound implications for the privacy rights of individuals and organizations.

The law is constantly adjusting to technology — the phone tap, the pen register, the thermal imaging device, are one of many items to get into your house.  We've commented earlier about the use of cellphone tracking technology on where and how to find you.  In each of the technology questions lies the issue of choice, or lack thereof.

I have Rules of Engagement for clients: for their conduct around the court-house, in the court-room, and on the witness stand.  If you've done a case with me you have the ROE.  They need it, and typically the more senior the client the more the need for ROE.  So, it's timely of Angus to talk about:

Jim McElhaney, On Good Behavior: A witness who speaks simply and directly looks pretty good to a jury, ABA Magazine, February 2009.

Does this sound familiar?

The Army Court of Criminal Appeals has decided United States v. Lanier, No. 20080296 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 4 February 2009).   The opinion has some current value, even though this is a guilty plea and adequacy of the providency case.

In this case the appellant was granted EML from duty in Iraq because his father had had a stroke.  Appellant failed to return from his EML.  He never asked for his EML to be extended or a humanitarian transfer.  At trial he plead guilty to desertion with the intent to avoid hazardous service, in violation of Article 85(a)(2), UCMJ.

While deployed his squadron was engaged in frequently hostile operations.  The unit suffered numerous combat casualties while deployed, including at least three deaths during the time appellant served with his unit in Iraq.  At several points  . . . , appellant reiterated that his duties in Iraq were dangerous and hazardous, with a significant risk of violence and injury due to hostile encounters.  The stipulation of fact makes clear the hazardous character of the duty continued even after appellant quit his unit.   Slip op. at 2.

United States v. Jones, No. 07-10289-MLW, 2009 U.S. Dis. LEXIS 6434 (D. Mass. 21 January 2009).*

Prosecutors do this all the time.  Prosecutors either fail to provide discovery or do so in a slow-rolling fashion.  As the recent decision in Jones illustrates, it’s a gamble.  The gamble is that provided there is no showing of actual prejudice to the accused, there is no case related consequence, and possibly no personal consequence to the prosecution.

In Jones there is a history of discovery problems from that U.S. Attorneys Office.  The appellant wanted to suppress evidence.  The prosecutor objected to a suppression motion based on information provided by the police.  The judge, fortunately for appellant, held the hearing.  It was during the hearing that the failure to disclose Brady[1] material came to light.

Say it ain't so . . .

The Army Court of Criminal Appeals goes to Harvard Law School on 5 February 2009, to hear oral argument in a case that is closed to the public — or at least that's the perception.  Information came our way a short while ago from an attorney practicing before that court, and now CAAFLog has identified the Harvaad calendar entry which raises the issue of public access.

You can note that the Court's own calendar doesn't show an oral argument until 19 February 2009.  Could it be April yet?  Halloween?

In United States v. Remsburg, No. 20070161 (A. C.t. Crim. App. 30 January 2009), the court looked at three issues:  whether the judge improperly restricted defense solicitation of favorable victim impact testimony; whether the judge was mean to the defense counsel; and post-trial delay.  On the post-trial delay issue the court notes:

In his addendum, the SJA recommended the CA reduce appellant’s sentence by two months because “[a] two month reduction in the approved period of confinement should moot any issue regarding the post–trial processing of this case.”  Without explanation, the CA did not adopt the SJA recommendation and approved the sentence as adjudged.

I was happy to read that the defense aggressively made demands for speedy post-trial processing.  The appellant got his two months credit.

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