In considering whether conduct of a private citizen is subject to the Fourth Amendment, our court considers "whether the government had knowledge of and acquiesced in the intrusive conduct; whether  the

citizen intended to assist law enforcement agents or instead acted to

further his own purposes; and whether the citizen acted at the

"In Internet 'sting' cases such as this," the issue of "what a defendant's state of mind was immediately prior to his contact with a sexual target purporting to be a minor is routinely a serious point of contention. We call the issue one of 'predisposition,' and it is primarily a question of fact." United States v. Curtin, 489 F.3d 935, 951 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). Concerning such predisposition, "contextual and circumstantial evidence becomes acutely relevant to a defendant's material state of mind 'prior to his contact' with the object of his sexual attention and . . . such evidence is not only admissible, but may be critical." Id. at 952.

Here, the district court did not err in ruling that the ten images depicting child pornography were fairly attributable to Knowles. Forensic testimony indicated that the ten images at issue were kept in the same "AOL Downloads" folder found on Knowles' laptop as a photo depicting "Sassy13 Sarah" sent to Knowles by FBI Special Agent Brillhart, and that storing images in that folder involved a series of interactive steps requiring the user's management (viz., clicking on "save" to download an image attached to an email into the designated folder). This process contrasted with the routine automatic downloading and temporary "caching" of files on the laptop's hard drive by web browser software without any user participation or choice.  (emphasis added.)

Nor did the district court err in ruling that the ten images were relevant to the issue of Knowles' intent, in particular his predisposition for sex with underage girls. The fact that Knowles had saved images of child pornography to his "AOL Downloads" folder tended to show such predisposition, in turn supporting an inference that his intent was to travel to Portland [*4] to attempt to entice a minor to engage in sexual activity. As to Knowles' predisposition, the probative value of these ten images outweighed their potential prejudicial effect, and the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting them.

United States v. Smither, No. 09-3-KSF, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17231 (E.D. Ky. March 6, 2009), is worth the read for a refresher on challenging search warrants because the information is stale.  Those of us who have tried are well aware that it's almost impossible to have a child pornography warrant suppressed for staleness.   The author at fourthamendment.com comments.

 Most cases just dispose of this argument simply. This opinion explains

it far better. To my knowledge no child porn defendant has won a

Personally, from experience, I'm not sure they do.  However, Judge Emmett Sullivan, of the D.C. for D.C. doesn't think so.

Here is an item on The BLT: The Blog of LegalTimes, Judge Threatens Justice Lawyers With Contempt Over Detainee Documents, 13 March 2009.

So-called Brady rules require prosecutors to hand over

Here is an interesting CAAF grant in a Coast Guard case.

No. 08-0719/CG.  U.S. v. Webster M. SMITH.  CCA 1275.  Review granted on the following issue:

WHETHER THE MILITARY JUDGE VIOLATED APPELLANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO CONFRONT HIS ACCUSERS BY LIMITING HIS CROSS-EXAMINATION OF [SR], THE GOVERNMENT'S ONLY WITNESS, ON THREE OF THE FIVE CHARGES.

Kevin Maurer, Wounded soldier's care probed, FayObserver.com, 11 March 2009.

If this report is believed, injured and wounded soldiers in medical holding company's are disciplined at a higher rate than line company's.

Apparently, it is not an excuse for a failure to go that your prescribed medication for you injury or illness causes you to be late for formation.  Seems to me there's at least the possibility of a defense based on impossibility or something similar.

Two new CAAF cases have been put up on the website.

United States v. Stephens, __ M.J. ___ (C.A.A.F. Mar. 12, 2009).  The prosecution called the victims father to talk about the effect the trial had on her.

Appellant, citing United States v. Mobley, 31 M.J. 273 (C.M.A. 1990), United States v. Carr, 25 M.J. 637 (A.C.M.R. 1987), and Burns v. Gammon, 260 F.3d 892 (8th Cir. 2001), argues that the father’s testimony was an impermissible comment on Appellant’s right to plead not guilty, confront the witnesses against him, and put the Government to its proof, and hence constitutional error.

Drew Brooks, Kreutzer enters guilty plea, no longer faces death penalty, FayObserver.com, 11 March 2009.  Some observations (on the article, and assuming the article is correct).  There is no word in the article about how the family is taking this and what role they did or did not play in the negotiations.  As we've discussed elsewhere, the family must be consulted under the Victim Witness Assistance Program rules, although the Army isn't bound to follow the victim's wishes.

1.  He was sentenced to "life," which is mandatory.  The UCMJ amendment authorizing Life Without Possibility of Parole was passed after Kreutzer was sentenced first time around.  See Article 56a, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. 856a.  Under current regulations it will be many years before he becomes eligible for parole.  And as a practical matter he's unlikely to see parole.

2.  "prosecutors will try to persuade Parrish to raise the aggravated assault charges to attempted premeditated murder charges."  Anyone have any idea what this means?  Is the prosecution trying to make a major variance on the charge sheet post-referral, post-something?

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