Federal Evidence Review has put up a very good list of Supreme Court cases that impact evidence issues in a case.  The list "includes constitutional, statutory, and Federal Rules of Evidence – based evidence-related cases."  The list is by its nature discretionary and subject to change, but a useful reminder.  Who knows, the Supreme Court may eventually issue an opinion in Melendez-Diaz.

No. 09-0185/AR.  U.S. v. Makisha I. MORTON.  CCA 20060458.  Review granted on the following issue:

WHETHER, AFTER FINDING THE EVIDENCE FACTUALLY INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A FINDING OF GUILTY TO THE ADDITIONAL CHARGE AND ITS SPECIFICATION (FORGERY), THE ARMY COURT ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANT GUILTY OF A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE ON A THEORY NOT PRESENTED TO THE TRIER OF FACT.

The court might consider the resolution in United States v. Thompson, 67 M.J. 106 (C.A.A.F. 2009).

Every so often the defense wants a co-accused to testify because they have something beneficial to say and they have already said it at the Article 32, UCMJ, hearing.  As we know, the prosecution almost never willingly immunizes the witness, and judges don't always force the issue.  (Odd how that happens to the defense, but never the prosecution.)

Anyway, check out, Federal Evidence Review's, item, Former grand jury testimony of cooperating witness should have been presented to the jury under FRE 804(b)(1); Ninth Circuit adopts broad application of “similar motive” requirement, in United States v. McFall, _ F.3d _ (9th Cir. March 9, 2009) (No. 07-10034).

This is a case where the alleged co-accused's testified to Brady material (my construction of this) at the grand jury hearings in the case.  Of course the prosecution objected to having the grand jury testimony of the witnesses played at the accused's trial.  The witnesses had invoked their Fifth Amendment privilege at trial.  The government wasn't interested in having the witnesses evidence before the jury so they had not called the witnesses themselves, even though the witnesses had agreed to cooperate with the prosecution.

A little off topic, but I thought sufficiently interesting for a military justice audience.

Martha Neil, DOJ Files USERRA Suit Against Indiana Law Firm, ABA Journal Law News Now, 16 March 2009.

Referenced is another:  Matthew Whittle, lawsuit involving braswell and former magistrate settled, Goldsboro News-Argus (on-line), 8 March 2009).

Here are several articles of some interest.

Roger P. Alford, International or Foreign Law as an Interpretive Aid in Supreme Court Jurisprudence, 9(3) Engage 79 (October 2008).

Tom Gede, Kent Scheidegger, Fon Rychlak, The Supreme Court's 21st Century Trajectory in Criminal Cases, 9(3) Engage 44 (October 2008).

Rule 1102. Amendments.  Amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence shall apply to the Military Rules of Evidence 18 months after the effective date of such amendments, unless action to the contrary is taken by the President.

On September 19, 2008, Fed. R. Evid. 502, a new evidence rule concerning the attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine, was enacted. See Pub. L. No. 110-322, 122 Stat. 3537.

Pending Rule Amendment: Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3) (Declarations Against Interest)

It app-ears that ear print comparisons have been advocated as a method of identifying a perpetrator.  But, it app-ears that the British courts are giving the so-called expert an earful of doubt.

Andre A. Moenssens, Another Ear Print Conviction Reversed!  (Prof. Moenssens is one of several law professors to follow on issues of forensics and evidence.  A lot more can be found at Forensic-Evidence.com.

Credibility is always an issue.

There may be a legitimate question that the Intoxlyzer 5000 does discriminate against African-Americans.  This test is in use throughout much of DoD.  It seems at least worth researching and filing a Houser motion in regard to this technology if your client is African-American, and perhaps if the client is a woman.  See United States v. Houser, 36 M.J. 392 (C.A.A.F. 1993), which sets out six factors a judge should use to determine the admissibility of expert testimony.  In my view, Houser can be used also to challenge the actual “science” underlying testimony for something such as a breath-test machine.  In United States v. Griffin, 50 M.J. 278 (C.A.A.F. 1999), the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces makes specific the application of the Daubert factors under a Houser analysis.

Colin Miller, KKK In A Box?: Connecticut To Replace Controversial Intoxilyzer 5000 With Equally Controversial Alcotest 7110 MKIII-C, EvidenceProf Blog, 15 February 2009.

The basis for this claim is that that “Dr. Michael Hlastala, a lung physiologist at the University of Washington, examined research of other lung physiologists and with his own research determined the Intoxilyzer 5000 does not adequately test black men.” (Specifically, according to Hlastala, the lung capacity of an African-American male is approximately 3% smaller than that of a Caucasian. “Because of the smaller capacity, an arrestee must expel a greater fraction of his lung capacity, [and] the Intoxilyzer 5000 results are inflated by a factor of 3 percent,” Hlastala concluded).
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