In a number of cases Judge Wiss made the statement about the CCA’s that
"[T]here are some places where even ‘the proverbial 800-pound gorilla’ is not free to roam."
See e.g., United States v. Parker, 36 M.J. 269, 273 (C.M.A. 1993)(citing United States v. Bethea, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 223, 46 C.M.R. 223 (1973)) (Wiss, J. concurring).
Coastline Courier reports:
The start date in a Fort Stewart soldier’s death penalty case has been delayed, to give the defense time to have their experts examine additional evidence and to accommodate witnesses coming to the United States from Iraq.
Army Times reports a change in status:
Military.com reports:
The Navy says a second officer has been transferred from his job pending investigation into the showing of lewd videos on the aircraft carrier USS Enterprise.
Rear Adm. Dennis Moynihan, a Navy spokesman, said Thursday that Rear Adm. Lawrence Rice has been transferred out of his job at Joint Forces Command. His retirement planned for Feb. 1 is being delayed.
United States v. Jones.
A convoluted case about the accused’s ability to review CP images in preparation for his providence inquiry.
We conclude that the denial of the requests to review
evidence under the circumstances of this case did not
violate the Sixth Amendment because Appellant did not seek
to review the evidence to prepare a defense, and that
Appellant’s unconditional guilty plea waived appellate
review of the denial of his discovery requests under Rule
for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 701. And we agree with the
NMCCA that, considering the stipulation of fact in
conjunction with Appellant’s providence inquiry, there was
no substantial basis in law or fact for the military judge
to reject Appellant’s guilty plea in this case. Jones,
2009 CCA LEXIS 356, at *21, 2009 WL 3435920, at *7.
As federalevidencereview notes:
[A]llowing a court to take judicial notice often presents a proponent of its use with a useful short-cut in proof of adjudicative facts. But it is important to draw a distinction between the fact noticed and the logical conclusion to be drawn from the fact.
From time to time you will see a prosecutor want to have judicial notice of facts, but include in their motion their argument or conclusions. Remember that there must be a foundation for the notice offered at the time of the request. For example a calendar for judicial notice that a date fell on a particular day of the week, or a copy of the regulation or statute.
United States v. Hutchins.
Chief Judge Effron writes for a unanimous court.
The Judge Advocate General of the Navy certified the case to this Court for review of the following issues:
I. WHETHER THE NAVY-MARINE CORPS COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING, INTER ALIA, THAT THE MILITARY JUDGE SEVERED THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP WITH CAPTAIN BASS?
II. WHETHER UNDER R.C.M. 505(d)(2)(B), THE NAVYMARINE CORPS COURT INCORRECTLY FOUND NO “GOOD CAUSE” ON THE RECORD FOR THE REPLACEMENT OF APPELLANT’S SECOND DETAILED DEFENSE COUNSEL WITH ANOTHER COUNSEL?
III. WHETHER THE LOWER COURT APPLIED THE WRONG STANDARD AND ERRONEOUSLY PRESUMED, WITHOUT ASSESSING, PREJUDICE AND SET ASIDE THE FINDINGS AND SENTENCE, WHERE APPELL[EE]’S STATUTORY RIGHTS, AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, WERE SATISFIED THROUGH TRIAL?
Prof. Friedman links to the respondents’s brief in Bullcoming v. New Mexico.
Two Supreme Court grants of certiorari should be of interest to MJ practitioners. Here are links to SCOTUSBLog for the case materials.
Missouri v. Frye
Issue: Can a defendant who validly pleads guilty assert a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel by alleging that, but for counsel’s error in failing to communicate a plea offer, he would have pleaded guilty with more favorable terms? What remedy, if any, should be provided for ineffective assistance of counsel during plea bargain negotiations if the defendant was later convicted and sentenced pursuant to constitutionally adequate procedures?
On Friday, NMCCA decided U.S. v. Wuterich.
More later, but:
In response to Orders issued by this court, the respondents produced the required transcripts, relevant exhibits, and a sealed memorandum prepared by the military judge recounting an ex parte hearing he conducted with defense counsel on the severance issue. Having reviewed the record and pleadings of the parties, we find that the military judge’s detailed, complete findings of fact are well-supported and not clearly erroneous. Having completed our review, we conclude that the sealed memorandum should remain sealed, and that the military judge did not abuse his discretion in severing the attorney-client relationship.
NMCCA has decided United States v. Owens.
The appellant asserts that the attorney-client relationship with his detailed trial defense counsel was terminated without good cause, leaving the appellant legally and factually without post-trial representation. The basis for the appellant’s claim is that substitute counsel failed to establish an attorney-client relationship with the appellant prior to receipt of the staff judge advocate’s recommendation (SJAR).
The court makes clear in footnote 3, that:
Court-Martial Trial Practice Blog
