The Inspector Rutledge detective stories are a favorite of mine. To quote an Amazon review:
[T]he books are set in the period just after the First World War, and Inspector Rutledge is a veteran of said conflict. Even more unique, he’s haunted by the ghost of one of his subordinates, a corporal whom Rutledge had to shoot and kill after the man panicked and tried to run away during a battle. The dead man doesn’t blame Rutledge for the incident, not exactly anyway, and serves as a sort of alter ego for Rutledge. You’re never entirely certain whether Hamish MacLeod’s ghost is really there, or merely a figment of Rutledge’s imagination, given that he was horribly scarred psychologically by the war.
Hamish talks to the inspector and is often quicker to spot a problem, an inconsistency, or a wrong – “b’ware” he’ll say, or sometimes just “’ware.”
As defense counsel we all need a Hamish (not one we have killed of course). Sentencing is often the time in a trial when the ability to put as much favorable influential evidence or information before the fact-finder is at its apogee. That’s a good thing because the actual fundamental purpose of sentencing is – to parse the rules, “to mete out an appropriate sentence for this offender and offenses.” For some reason that’s why it struck me that United States v. Takara, ACM S31832 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 13 July 2012)(unpub.), is worth the read.