Articles Tagged with mre

To paraphrase CMTG, Military (Federal) Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1) provides that

A statement is not hearsay if:

1.  The declarant testifies and is subject to cross-examination about a prior statement.

2.  The declarant testified under oath at a prior “hearing” or “or proceeding.”

Impeachment with conviction.

Mil. R. Evid. 609(b) issues of impeachment with a prior conviction rarely come up at court-martial.  But if there were to be a prior conviction there may be some interpretation necessary.  So parsing several posts of Prof. Colin Miller the Great at Evidence Prof Blog, here we go.

If you want to find an especially terrible analysis of Rule 609(b), you need to look no further than the recent opinion of the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Colon, 2012 WL 1368162 (11th Cir. 2012). Even worse, that terrible analysis meant that the Eleventh Circuit sidestepped the most interesting issue in the case.

Military (Federal) Rule of Evidence 803(3) provides an exception to the rule against hearsay for

A statement of the declarant’s then-existing state of mind (such as motive, intent, or plan) or emotional, sensory, or physical condition (such as mental feeling, pain, or bodily health), but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the validity or terms of the declarant’s will.

While the rule appears to allow a broad exception for hearsay, the Supreme Court of VA points out the narrowing language still has effect.*

From my very first opinion on this Court, I have consistently concluded that Mil.R.Evid. 410 must be applied broadly to be consistent with its purpose. United States v. Barunas, 23 M.J. 71, 75-76 (CMA 1986). See also Fed.R.Evid. 410. Speaking for the Court in Barunas, I said:

The general purpose of Mil.R.Evid. 410 and its federal civilian counterpart, Fed.R.Evid. 410, is to encourage the flow of information during the plea-bargaining process and the resolution of criminal charges without "full-scale" trials. See United States v. Grant, 622 F.2d [308,] at 313 [(8th Cir. Ark. 1980)]; see generally Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260-61, 92 S. Ct. 495, 497-98, 30 L. Ed. 2d 427 (1971). An excessively formalistic or technical approach to this rule may undermine these policy concerns in the long run. United States v. Herman, 544 F.2d [791,] at 797 [(5th Cir. Fla. 1977)].See generally Wright and Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure: Evidence § 5345 (1980). A failure to recognize and enforce the military expansion of this rule may have the same effect.  23 M.J. at 76.

United States v. Anderson, 55 M.J. 182 (C.A.A.F. 2001)(Sullivan, J., concurring).

I think it fair to consider Mil. R. Evid. 410 a form of privilege although not found in the 500 series of rules.  Fourthamendment.com notes an interesting case about application of Fed. R. Evid. 410.  In reading the case it appears the federal courts may take a more restrictive view of the rule compared to application of Mil. R. Evid. 410.

Federal Evidence Review has a good reminder that what may appear to be statements admissible as excited utterances may not in fact be so.  Thus, defense as always your job is to ensure that the prosecution doesn’t get away with ritualistic or talismanic incantations of, “it’s an excited utterance (or some other exception)".”

United States v. Erickson, ___ F.3d ___ (8th Cir. July 12, 2010).

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