article 120 Tag Archives — Court-Martial Trial Practice Blog

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December 22, 2023 | The Law Office of Philip D. Cave

On December 6, 2023, the Secretary of the Army, Ms. Christine Wormuth, fired Brigadier General (BG) Warren Wells, the Army’s chief prosecutor and head of the Office of the Special Trial Counsel (OSTC), for an email he had sent ten years prior while in a defense counsel role. This firing demonstrates that no military defense counsel can be certain that doing their job and defending you will not come back to haunt them down the road. It will always be in the back of their minds.

In 2013, Warren Wells was a Lieutenant Colonel and a Regional Defense Counsel supervising the Senior Defender Counsel at several Army bases and their subordinate military defense counsel. He sent an email to his Senior Defense Counsel on various defense matters that included a paragraph commenting on the pressure put on the Army by Congress and the media to send sexual assault cases to trial and then stated that they, as defense counsel were the last line of defense for the innocent. Ten years later, when Ms. Wormuth read the email, she found this sentiment so outrageous that she fired BG Wells within hours!

Today, every military defense counsel knows (especially in the Army) that something they do or say in your defense can be held against them in the years to come when they are up for promotion or in a different position as a JAG. The military branches try to have independent defense counsel while they are in defense counsel positions, but as the BG Wells story illustrates: nothing protects them when they are no longer in a defense counsel position. Your military defense counsel will hopefully do their best to represent you anyway, but he or she is not conflict-free, no matter how hard they try.

NMCCA sets aside a Article 120 case for instructional error

August 19, 2010 | The Law Office of Philip D. Cave

In the United States v. Jones the facts cited by the court show a consent defense. However the defense counsel did not request an instruction on the affirmative defense and the military judge did not give one. There being no evidence of an affirmative waiver the findings and sentence were set aside.

A military judge has a sua sponte duty to instruct the members on an affirmative defense if it is reasonably raised by the evidence. United States v. McDonald, 57 M.J. 18, 20
(C.A.A.F. 2002). Failure by the defense counsel to request the instruction does not waive the error. United States v. Brown, 43 M.J. 187, 189 (C.A.A.F. 1995)(citing United States v. Taylor, 26 M.J. 127, 129 (C.M.A. 1988). Failure by the military judge to instruct on an affirmative defense presents a constitutional error which must be tested for prejudice. For such an error to be deemed harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, the Government must prove that the members would have reached the same verdict absent the error. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 19 (1999).

We agree with the appellant that the affirmative defense of consent was reasonably raised by the appellant’s sworn testimony. As noted above, the appellant posited a scenario in which the purported victim, Cpl B, was an unambiguously willing participant in the sexual contact alleged, ostensibly even the instigator and aggressor.

Another LIO case

July 6, 2010 | The Law Office of Philip D. Cave

Here is an interesting Order in United States v. Aguilar where the court has specified an issue.

Whether assault consummated by a battery in violation of Article 128, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 928, of which the appellant was convicted, is a lesser included offense of the charged Rape by Use of Physical Violence in violation of Article 120, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 920, if the proof does not show the assault is the alleged act of physical violence that compelled sexual intercourse.1

The footnote is: