Articles Posted in Members (Jury) Issues

In this earlier blog, I commented on the pending litigation over unanimous verdicts at courts-martial. As military defense lawyers we continue to support the advice given that the issue should be raised in all courts going forward.

The update is that the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces has decided United States v. Anderson. The unanimous court decided that there was still no constitutional requirement for a unanimous court-martial verdict, despite the Supreme Court decision in Ramos v. Louisiana.

That means we must now wait until the issue gets presented to the Supreme Court for a final ruling on the issue. It can take time for the Supreme Court to decide to take on an issue. That was our experience as appellate military defense counsel in United States v. Weiss, 36 M.J.224 (C.M.A. 1992) aff’d Weiss v. United States. 510 U.S. 163 (1994). So,

Military lawyers know that since the Supreme Court decided Ramos v. Louisiana, the U. S. military is the only federal jurisdiction that does not require unanimous findings of guilt.

Currently, a military jury (called a Panel of Members) must have eight members in a general court-martial (12 if it’s a death penalty case) and four in a special court-martial. Article 29. Three-fourths of the members must vote for a finding of guilty. Article 52.

That is the current law in the military, but it is being challenged. The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces has several cases on the issue of unanimous verdicts, which will be decided this term. If the court decides in favor of unanimous verdicts, then the Government will likely appeal to the U. S. Supreme Court (or vice-versa).

Thanks to Prof. Berman at Sentencing Law 7 Policy who directs us to Murray, Brian, Are Collateral Consequences Deserved? (January 29, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=

I have a standard sex offender registration motion that I use in all cases in which a sex offense is charged and if convicted the client will have to register as a sex offender.

Few appellate courts have been willing to agree that SOR is a punishment and hold that to be a collateral consequence.  Some state supreme courts have held new amendments to their state law are “punishment” for ex post facto analysis, but they are few.  Despite that, I continue to argue that SOR is more than a collateral consequence.  As the second part of my motion, I argue admissibility of SOR as “evidence” under the principles for giving punishment, on which the members are instructed: particularly rehabilitation and deterrence.

The SCOTUS might soon give us an idea on the subject of jury nullification in Lee v. United States.

Issue: Whether it is always irrational for a noncitizen defendant with longtime legal resident status and extended familial and business ties to the United States to reject a plea offer notwithstanding strong evidence of guilt when the plea would result in mandatory and permanent deportation.

It is not obvious from the Issue that nullification is central to the case.  But, Ilya Shapiro, The Right to Hope for Jury Nullification, CATO Institute, 9 February 2017, explains.

SCOTUSBlog has an interesting post about the court’s relist practice.  Some of us discussed the relist option when the court was considering the petition in United States v. Sullivan,  74 M.J. 448 (C.A.A.F. 2015) cert. denied.

When last we wrote about the statistics of relists a little over a year ago, it was to report on what was then a new trend: the court’s practice of routinely relisting petitions that are under serious consideration for review at second or subsequent conferences prior to entering orders granting or denying certiorari. The practice is by now an accepted feature of the certiorari process, and at least one relist is generally viewed as a necessary step on the way to a grant of further review. Here, we offer an update on the statistics of relists. Focusing on October Term 2015, we highlight some emerging trends in what appears to be an evolving practice.

Regrettably, on 3 October 2016 the court declined to take Captain Sullivan’s petition.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The Real Cost Of Having Commanders In Charge Of Military Justice

This article has appeared in Task & Purpose as a result of United States v. Woods,  decided by the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces on 18 June 2015.

Incredibly, a senior naval officer was appointed to be the president of a court-martial panel when in a questionnaire prepared when first told she’d be a court-martial member in the future, the member answered thus about the presumption of innocence.

The Coast Guard has an interesting opinion in United States v. Sullivan, on a members panel stacking.

A military accused does not have the same “jury” right as a civilian accused, but he does have the right to a panel (jury) that is fair and impartial.  United States v. Roland, 50 M.J. 66, 68 (1999); United States v. Nash, 71 M.J. 83 (C.A.A.F. 2011).  Oddly, and unlike the civilian case, it is the person who orders the trial who gets to select who will decide the case he has referred to trial.  The commander cannot systematically or for bad motive select a panel likely to be biased in some way toward an accused.  For example, a person who believes that all convicted accused’s must be punitively discharged.  The primary engine for challenging members once appointed is through voir dire, and then showing actual or implied bias.  United States v. Gooch, 69 M.J. 353 (C.A.A.F. 2010).

This is the second Coast Guard panel challenge case in just a short period.  United States v Riesbeck has been examined here, by colleague Sam Adams.  Riesbeck may be viewed as a “normal” issue of panel stacking.  Panel stacking questions often arise with rank or gender of the selected members.  There is the anomalous case of volunteerism in United States v. Dowty, 60 M.J. 163 (C.A.A.F. 2004), [1] which joins Sullivan as being an oddity – serious, but odd.

How many times during a trial do you try to guess what the members are thinking, and what their decision is – I would suggest we do that many times throughout a trial.  We do this because we are responding to a client’s comment about a look, a question, or the demeanor of one or more members. We do this to try and sense how our case is going for tactical reasons.  We do this because we hope to gain some “insight” on the next steps.  A pretty common reason is whether or not we feel the client needs to testify.

Of course we can never know what the members are really thinking.  During the occasional after court talk it becomes clear that what we thought the members were thinking was not what they were thinking, etc., etc., etc.

So, it’s a worthwhile effort in situational awareness to try and monitor the members.  But what happens if their thinking becomes more obvious or blatant – or possibly so.  At times, I have addressed the issue of the members having already decided the case or evidenced a bias because of a question one of them has asked.

The Military Judge’s Benchbook (MJBB) is the bible for how a military judge will instruct the members of your court-martial under the UCMJ.  Your military defense lawyer should be well versed in this book and these instructions.  The military judge will tell the members what elements of the crime must be proved beyond reasonable doubt; she will tell them about how they may consider evidence presented in court; and she will tell them the voting procedures they must follow to ensure a secret written ballot without undue command influence.

Military appellate courts are not enthused with deviations from the MJBB, even though it is quite possible to do that.  Oddly, the military court of criminal appeals allow for minor deviations and don’t actually require exacting compliance with the MJBB.  See for example, United States v. Bigelow, 57 M.J. 64 (C.A.A.F. 2002).  On the other hand the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces {CAAF) has cautioned against significant deviations from the MJBB, unless adequately explained on the record.  United States v. Rush, 54 M.J. 313 (C.A.A.F. 2001).  That’s what happened with the litigation over challenges to Article 120, when a military judge ignored the law and also the MJBB, and advised the members that the accused did not have any burden to prove consent.

It may not matter if the judge does not follow the MJBB when instructing the members.  For example in a recent case the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) decided that the judge had made a mistake in not instructing on a defense, but that the error was harmless.  We don’t need to go too deep into this area of trial practice; this is something your appellate military defense lawyer and trial military defense lawyer should know about and discuss with you.

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